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INTERESTS AND POLICY CLASHES IN CONFLICT OF LAWS
Robert Kramer *
In several recent articles ' Professor Cowan has suggested that the
development of the law in many fields would be immensely clarified
and aided if we recognized that frequently there are involved here new
types of interests-group interests-in addition to individual and social
or public-at-large interests. Simultaneously, Professor Currie 2 in a series
of articles has advanced the thesis that supposed conflict of law questions
should be analyzed in terms of the interests of the various states in-
volved in order to determine if in fact there is a true conflicts issue
raised and, if so, how to dispose of that issue. My purpose in this essay
is to attempt to combine these two suggestions, if possible, in order to
explore some of their extremely interesting ramifications in choice of
law problems in conflict of laws.
I
The ordinary civil action in a common-law jurisdiction employing
the adversary system normally has quite obviously embodied a clash of
individual interests. The plaintiff demands something from the defend-
ant which the latter refuses to yield-be it money damages, a specific
chattel, a piece of land, or the doing or stopping of an act or course of
conduct. The law in the nineteenth century often attempted to solve its
problems in terms of this conflict of individual interests. By the end of
that century, and certainly by the beginning of the twentieth century,
we realized that a law suit even between two private persons often in-
volved not only their conflicting individual interests but also, as Pound
* Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. See Cowan, The Impact of Social Security on the Philosophy of Law: The
Protection of Interests Based on Group Membership, ii RUTGERS L. REV. 688
(1957); Cowan, Group Interests, 44 VA. L. REV. 331 (958). In some areas group
interests may be relatively unimportant. See COHEN, ROBSON, & BATES, PARENTAL
AUTHORITY: THE COMMUNITY AND THE LAW 202-3 (1958).
2. See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Con-
flict of Laws, lo STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958); Currie, Married Women's Contracts:
A Study in Conflicts-of-Law Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958); Currie, On
The Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964 (1958); Currie,
The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial
Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958); Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives
in the Conflict of Laws, a paper presented at the Conflict of Laws Roundtable of
the Association of American Law Schools, Chicago, Ill., Dec. 29, 1958, reprinted in
8 DUKE L.J. 171 (1959). See also Kelso, The Process of Analyzing Choice-of-Law Prob-
lems, 1959 WASH. U. L.Q. 37.
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so carefully pointed out and elaborated,3 social interests: interests of the
state and of the entire community or public at large in maintaining
peace, order, stability, fostering certain highly regarded social and in-
dividual values, checking or regulating or controlling other social and
individual values. Frequently these social interests clashed with each
other or with the individual interests present in a law suit. The job of
the law then was to prevent these clashes, to work out necessary com-
promises and adjustments, to determine what were the individual and
social interests a law suit revealed and which of these interests should
prevail, and to what extent, over others where conflicts arose. As govern-
ment undertook more and more regulation and control of private
business enterprise and individual conduct and thought, these conflicts
of iridividual interests with social interests both multiplied and became
more readily apparent. The pace of this development was further ac-
celerated when government not only regulated or controlled but also
began to own and operate businesses, to carry on itself many activities
formerly left almost entirely to individual and private initiative.
Overlooked at times, perhaps, in these striking and dramatic de-
velopments of our present century, was the fact that another type of
interest, easily confused with but really very different from either in-
dividual or social interests, was present in many legal problems of our
modern life-the group interest. Group interests are especially evident
in the form of claims made either by or against those in a group or a
status or role relationship. They resemble individual interests for they
are made by individuals, not the state or the entire public at large, but,
unlike individual interests, they are made on behalf of individuals as or
in a group. The distinctive thing about them is their group or as-
sociative nature which makes them quite different from either an in-
dividual or a social, public-at-large, interest. Frequently they are asserted
against all of society. The group demands that society grant it special
rights, privileges, or treatment-the right to a fair price or wage, to a
job, to old age security. Because of their group nature, it is all too easy
to confuse them with true social interests-a confusion often fostered
by the group asserting the interest-but unlike a true social interest the
group interest is often a purely selfish one for the betterment mainly
of the group at the expense of the rest of society, not for the betterment
3. See Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1943); Pound,
A Survey of Public Interests, 58 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1945); Pound, Individual
Interests of Substance-Promised Advantages, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1945); POUND,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, ch. 6 (rev. ed. 1954); Patterson,
Some Reflections on Sociological Jurisprudence, 44 VA. L. REV. 395 (1958); Patter-
son, Pound's Theory of Social Interests, in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHIES 558 (1947); PATrERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW
§ 4.61 (1953); THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS; SELECTED WRITINGS OF MAX
RUMELIN AND OTHERS (1948); STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW, chs.
XX-XXIII (1946).
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of the entire community or all of society (although the group seldom
hesitates to assert that its interests and those of society-at-large are the
same and identical).
Group interests have become especially prominent in contemporary
life as more and more we turn to the state to supply us with things-
often in the nature of benefits or bounties as well as necessities and
services-which we deem essential and feel we are entitled to as a matter
of right, because of the special services our particular group-union,
farmer, oil producer, employer-believes it renders to all of society, or
the payments the group may have actually made for these benefits or
services in many cases. Various groups demand that society guarantee
them a job, a fair price for their work, security against unemployment,
illness, old age, and other hazards of life. The social security interest is
perhaps a vast amalgamation of widely differing group interests, and our
failure thus far to differentiate these interests and to work out ap-
propriate treatment and benefits for each group has caused much
difficulty and dissatisfaction, as in workmen's compensation.
The rapid growth and extension of the insurance principle-the
spreading of risks over a large but definite group-is another striking
illustration. Insurance obviously is not an individual matter, but neither
is it one for the entire community-risk of loss is shared not by everyone
but by a definite selected group of policyholders. The group nature of
insurance is, of course, strikingly apparent in so called "group in-
surance," but it also is present even in the case of individual insurance
policies where there is a status or group relation of insureds, insurers,
and beneficiaries. The entire law of liability for unintentional torts has
been transformed by widespread adoption of the insurance or group
sharing of risk approach in such fields as work injuries and automobile
accident injuries. Here, too, we often tend to overlook the group rather
than social interest of many demands-employees, unions, employers,
insurers, each represent a group, not the entire public. The public in-
terest perhaps is simply to obtain the goods or services it desires at the
lowest possible costs, not to pay directly or indirectly for injuries to
workers on the job.
If Professor Cowan is right-and I believe he is-then the task which
Pound has called social engineering becomes vastly more difficult and
complex for the law than perhaps we may have formerly believed. We
first of all must identify and separate from each other the various in-
terests-individual, group, social-involved in our legal problem-by
no means an easy task, for interests tend to overlap, and group and in-
dividual interests always seek to identify themselves with the larger
social interests.4 Then our job has but begun. We must ascertain to
4. Thus special concessions for groups under the federal income tax are always
sought on the ground that what benefits the favored group will benefit the public
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what extent there are clashes or conflicts among or between the
identified interests. Next we must determine who in our society-
legislature, administrative agency, court, executive official-is to decide
the conflicts, to make compromises and adjustments, to assign priorities,
to determine the values of the competing interests and which shall pre-
vail and to what extent. The problems of valuation alone present per-
plexing questions-the interdependency of ends and means, the relative
importance of both reason and feeling or intuition, the need for acute
semantic analysis. 5 In one way or another-perhaps all too often by a
kind of unconscious and muddled half-thought-out process-we do
decide upon an adjustment of the clashing interests-an adjustment
embodied in what we may call the policy (or public policy) of the state,
expressed either in a legislative enactment, administrative rule or order,
judicial decision, or edict of the market place, or of Mrs. Grundy. The
question of who should make this evaluation or adjustment of the con-
flicts is another matter to which we have given far too little thought.
Which conflicts are justiciable, which fall within the broad scope of
legislative policy, which should be given to administrative adjudication
or rule making, which may best be left to the mechanism of the market
place or to some private group, are matters we simply have no definite
objective criteria for deciding.6 A just, decent, and orderly adjustment
of these clashes of interests demands that each interest-individual,
group, social-be adequately represented and have a chance to present
its case before a decision is made. Yet courts have rarely, if ever, devised
adequate methods for handling such multi-party clashes, and legislative
and administrative hearings frequently are so dominated and over-
whelmed by the clamors of powerful groups that social or individual
as a whole. See Cary, Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in
Honor of the Departng Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 HARV. L. REV. 745 (1955);
Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get
Enacted, 7o HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1957); Johnson, The Last Taxpayer, 30 TAXES 181
(1952); Blum and Johnson, 1913-2013, A Hundred Years of Income Taxes, 33
TAXES 41 (1955); Kramer, The "Uneasy Case" in Jurisprudence, 44 VA. L. REV.
379 (1958).
5. See Kramer, The "Uneasy Case" in Jurisprudence, 44 VA. L. REV. 379 (1958);
Kramer, Values in Land Use Controls: Some Problems, 7 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1958);
FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at
Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL ED. 457 (1954); Note, Natural Law for Today's Lawyer, 9
STAN. L. REV. 455 (1957); Symposium-Ethical Values and the Law in Action,
12 OHIO ST. L.J. 1-68 (1951); Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L REV.
376 (1946); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593 (1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 7 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958); Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 3
NATURAL L. F. 68 (I958); Nagel, On the Fusion of Fact and Value: A Reply to
Professor Fuller, id. at 77; Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, id. at 83.
6. See Fuller, Some Reflections on Legal and Economic Freedoms-A Review
of Robert L. Hale's "Freedom Through Law," 54 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (1954); Fuller,
Freedom-A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1305 (1955); M. POLANYI, THE
LOGIC OF LIBERTY: REFLECTIONS AND REJOINDERS (1951).
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interests may be overlooked or neglected. 7 Markets may cease to function
in a representative manner if dominated by powerful groups, and groups
may callously disregard individual and social rights and interests.
1I
Suppose, however, that we have determined by some means what the
policy of the state shall be in handling and working out these clashes of
various kinds of interests. What happens when we move into the realm
of conflict of laws? Here we face clashes of interests between individuals,
groups, and communities located, not all in one sovereign state, but in
two or more such states. In a sense we move from the three-dimensional
universe of individual, group, and social interests, into a multi-
dimensional universe. We have not simply conflicts of interests-indi-
vidual, group, and social-among themselves and with each other; we
have a clash between the policy of one state-how it adjusts the clashing
interests-and the policy of another state-the different solution that
state has for a similar clash of like interests. And, of course, more than
two states may be involved; we may have policy conflicts here of sev-
eral states.
The word "policy" is not one I am quite happy about, because in law
it so often, especially as public policy, has little or no real meaning.
In conflict of laws, in particular, public policy frequently is used to con-
ceal the real factors influencing a decision to apply the law of the forum
instead of foreign law, or represents simply a blind, intuitive grasping
by a judge for what seems to him a fair result in a case, or even may
amount to no more than a total failure by a court to attempt to ration-
alize its decision and solve the tough problems presented by a given
case.8 Yet I know of no better word to express a state's answer to the
clashes of interests that arise in a purely internal situation.
Professor Currie has addressed himself to the question whether the
policy solution adopted by a state or the forum for a clash of competing
7. See Jaffe, The Eflective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation,
67 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1954); Jaffe, Book Review, 65 YALE L.J. io68 (1956);
Symposium-The Growth of the Administrative Process: A Reappraisal, 16 FED.
B.J. 443 (1956); Parker, Why Do Administrative Agencies Exist? A Reappraisal, 45
GEO. L.J. 331 (1957); Carrow, Current Problems in Administrative Law, 9 VA. L.
WEEKLY DICTA 1 (1958); Kramer, id. at 26; B. Schwartz, Administrative Justice
and Its Place in the Legal Order, 3o N.Y.U.L. REv. 1390 (1955); Cole, Administra-
tive Agencies and Judicial Powers, 44 A.B.A.J. 953 (1958); L. Schwartz, Legal
Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial
Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REV. 436, 473,(954). See note 4 supra.
8. See Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy' in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L.
REv. 969 (1956). Cf. Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict
of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027 (1940); Neuner, Policy Considerations in the Conflict
of Laws, 20 CAN. BAR RE v. 479 (1942); Yntema, The Objectives of Private Inter-
national Law, 35 CAN. BAR REV. 721 (1957); Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly
Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65
YALE L.J. 1087 (1956).
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interests of various kinds where all the interests and factors involved are
entirely local or internal should be extended in time and space, so to
speak, to cover an identical clash of like interests where there are some
interests or factors which relate to other, foreign states. He suggests
that, first of all, of course, we must correctly identify the competing
interests, and determine the state's (forum's) policy for a purely do-
mestic clash of these interests. Then, if counsel raise the issue in a proper
and timely manner,9 we must identify the foreign elements, interests,
or factors involved in our case and the state or states to which they are
connected, and if properly briefed by counsel, determine the policy of
the other state or states for a purely domestic clash of these same in-
terests. Having ascertained local (or forum) and foreign law or policy,
and the interest clashes involved in these policies, we then see if the
policies of the forum and of the other states conflict- if they do not, there
may well be no conflicts issue. If their policies do differ, so there ap-
parently is a conflicts problem, the next step is to ascertain, so far as
possible, from all possible sources, the reasons (or governmental in-
terests) behind the policy of each state-why did it prefer this interest
to that, why did it make this type of compromise or adjustment, why
did it subordinate the individual to the group interest or vice versa,
ignore the public interest, etc. By ascertaining the reasons (or interests)
behind each state's policy, we frequently obtain guidance-perhaps
conclusive evidence-about whether the policy in question should
be extended in time or space to cover a clashing of interests situation
involving non-local elements. In many instances, this type of approach
may reveal that the apparent conflict of policy is nonexistent because
the policy of one state clearly extends to a case with foreign elements
like ours, while the policy of the other state as clearly does not extend
to this situation.' Or if, in some cases, the policy of neither state may
extend to a situation with such foreign elements, there may be a gap,
so to speak, between their policies into which our case falls." Then, so
far as either state is concerned, it may be indifferent, from the stand-
9. Cf. Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 872 (1956); Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 26o, 84 A.2d 725 (1951); Cuba R.R. Co.
v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (i9i2). See Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the
Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964 (1958).
.o. Cf. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). But cf. Orr v.
Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 139 Atl. 691 (1928); Yount v. National Bank of Jackson,
327 Mich. 342, 42 N.W.2d 11o (95o); Sumner v. Brown, 312 Pa. 124, 167 Atl. 315
(1933); Friedman v. Greenberg, tio N.J.L. 462, 166 At. 119 (1933); Rathgeber v.
Sommerhalder, 112 N.J.L. 546, 171 At. 835 (1934); Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 142
Conn. 278, 113 A.2d 509 (1955).
i. Cf. Marie v. Garrison, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 210 (N.Y. 1883); Ormsby v. Chase,
290 U.S. 387 (1933); Dalton v. McClean, 137 Me. 4, 14 A.2d 13 (1940). But cf.
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954). See Currie, supra
note 9, at 102-2o; Currie, Survival of Actions, Adjudication versus Automation
in the Conflict of Laws, 1o STAN. L. REV. 205, 229-32 (1958).
[Vol. XlI1
CONFLICT OF LAWS
point of furthering its policy, how this particular case is decided. Also,
we may discover there is no real policy conflict because the basic
policies of the two states are really similar and differ only in minor,
relatively unimportant details and formalities. 12 Finally, there again may
appear to be a clash of policies because each state for legitimate reasons
and governmental interests desires to extend its policy to cover our case,
despite the foreign elements involved in it, and the policies of the two
states differ as to how the competing interests should be adjusted and
handled. Here there is an overlapping or clashing of states' policies.
Even in the last situation, Currie warns us,13 we may not have a true
conflicts situation because the policy clash may disappear upon further
analysis. In many instances the alleged policy clash is about an issue
which, to use Currie's phrase-one he admits is not a wholly happy
choice of language 14 -does not furnish the "rule of decision" for the
case in question.' Instead, it relates to a minor, subordinate, sub-
sidiary problem-often a question of status-does a person belong to a
group whose interests are given a preferred position under the forum's
statutory policy. In such situations, I think, perhaps the true explanation
for the lack of a real policy clash often is that we do not look to the law
or policy of the other state for a solution of the same competing in-
terests as are involved in the policy solution of the forum.
For example, the forum may be asked to rescind a contract for a basic
mistake of law. If the alleged mistake was made about the law of another
state, clearly the forum must determine what the law of the other state is
about which the alleged error occurred in order to decide whether there
actually was a mistake of law made by the party in question. 6 But the
forum has no reason to look into the competing interests behind the
law of the foreign state which was the subject of the alleged mistake.
The forum desires only to know what that law is, not why that law is
what it is. Or the forum may wish to find out in an automobile accident
suit if the drivers involved complied with the rules of the road of a
foreign state so far as driving on the right or left side of the road is
concerned, if the accident occurred in the foreign state. Again, the forum
is not concerned with the why of the foreign rule of the road, the reasons
12. Compare Kinney Loan & Finance Co. v. Sumner, 159 Neb. 57, 65 N.W.2d
240 (1954) with Personal Finance Co. v. Gilinsky Fruit Co., 127 Neb. 450, 255 N.W.
558 (1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 627 (1935). Cf. Pritchard v. Norton, 1o6 U.S. 124
(1882); MODEL EXECUTION OF WILLS AcT § 7. See Fuller, Consideration and Form,
41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941); Note, Preserving the Inviolability of Rules of Con-
flict of Laws by Statutory Construction, 49 HARV. L. REv. 319 (1935).
13. See Currie, supra note 9, at 1012-25.
14. Id. at 1o2 n. 163.
15. Ibid.
16. Cf, Haven v. Foster, 9 Pick, 112 (Mass. 1829). Or the forum may wish to
decide a question of devolution of its land, and this may depend upon whether an
alien heir's homeland permits inheritance by Americans of land there. See In re
Knutzen, 31 Cal.-2d 573, 191 P.2d 747 (1948).
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and interests behind the policy expressed by it, or whether the foreign
rule may differ from the forum's rule and policy and reasons and in-
terests involved therein. The forum merely seeks to find a standard of
conduct which its (the forum's) law uses to determine the liability of
defendant under the forum's law. 7 Of course, sometimes the forum may
decide that its rules of conduct apply to foreign conduct because of the
reasons and interests behind its statutory rule of conduct.
Similarly, in a workmen's compensation case the forum's statute may
award compensation to a "widow" of a deceased employee. The alleged
widow may base her claim solely upon a so-called marriage ceremony
performed by a tribal witch doctor in the jungles of Africa years ago,
a marriage recognized as valid in that African locality. Even assuming
such a marriage is not given recognition as such for most purposes in
the forum, it still may allow an award to the widow. The conflict of
policy over this type of marriage is only an apparent one-the reasons
behind the policy of the African state recognizing such a ceremony, the
clashing interests involved, obviously bear no real relationship to the
policy and reasons therefor and clashing interests at stake in granting or
denying an award to the alleged widow here. Of course, the court may
decide that the reasons and governmental interests behind the forum's
statutory policies for workmen's compensation require that only the
forum's law of marriage determine the validity of the alleged marriage.
If so, there will be no reference to the foreign law of marriage. On the
other hand, suppose by foreign marriage law as well as the forum's mar-
riage law the marriage is invalid. Still, the forum may consider plain-
tiff a "widow" for purposes of workmen's compensation, ignoring the
foreign marriage law, because the reasons and governmental interests
involved in the statutory policy of the award of workmen's compensation
may well warrant payment of compensation to her as a "widow" even if
not married for other purposes. The validity or invalidity of the foreign
marriage has such effect as the forum chooses to give it, considering the
forum's statutory policies, the reasons and governmental interests be-
hind them, and the individual, group, and social interests involved.18
17. So, too, the forum may refer to foreign law to see if certain conduct, such
as the transaction of business, is permissible on Sundays when the conduct occurred
in the foreign state, not the forum. Adams v. Gay, 19 Vt. 358 (1847); O'Rourke v.
O'Rourke, 43 Mich. 58, 4 N.W. 531 (188o); Naylor v. Conroy, 46 N.J. Super. 387,
134 A.2d 785 (App. Div. 1957). Of course, the forum may decide (no doubt
erroneously) that the reasons and governmental interests behind the statutory
policy of its Sunday Blue laws require that the policy be applied even to trans-
actions occurring in foreign states, at least if local residents are involved, or perhaps
if performance is related to the forum. Cf. Hill v. Wilker, 41 Ga. 449 (1871).
18. Cf. Sutton v. Lieb, 342 U.S. 402 (1952); Masocco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div.
181, 254 N.Y. Supp. 439 (1931); Konieczny v. J. Kresse Co., 234 App. Div. 517,
256 N.Y. Supp. 275 (1932). But cf. Vergnani v. Guidetti, 3o8 Mass. 450, 32 N.E.2d
272 (1941). See also Smithsonian Institution v. St. John, 214 U.S. 19 (19o9); Hood
v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 6 1 (1915); Olmstead v. Olmstead, 216 U.S. 386 (191o).
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One of the great virtues of Currie's thesis, it seems to me, is that it
enables us to distinguish those cases and situations where there are real
conflict problems, actual clashes of different states' policies for the
handling of identical competing interests, from spurious conflict cases,
where such clashes disappear upon analysis, because: either (i) the
policy of neither state applies, (2) the policy of only one state applies,
(3) the policies of the states are identical, or (4) foreign law is not looked
to as a rule of decision, so the reasons for its policy, the clashing interests
reflected in it, are irrelevant to decision of the instant case. By so doing
it may well eliminate or at least radically simplify such tantalizing
questions as those of renvoi and characterization-a consummation
devoutly to be wished. Characterization can never be wholly eliminated
but its special conflicts problems may be avoided. Renvoi may disappear
because we look only to internal law for a state's policy. We apply
foreign law only after deciding the forum's policy is inapplicable and
the foreign state's policy is applicable, in view of the reasons and
governmental interests behind these policies and the elements in
our case local to each state involved. Therefore, only the internal law,
so to speak, of the foreign state is ever applied here. Where neither
state's policy is really applicable, we apply the forum's law, unless the
reasons and governmental interests behind the forum's policy indicate
that to apply it is too unfair because it was never intended for a situation
with foreign elements like ours and therefore would work a manifest in-
justice here.
Currie himself, following both judicial opinions and scholars in the
field of conflicts, 19 has spoken in terms of the interest of the forum and
each state involved in a situation which includes foreign elements. I
have felt it desirable to employ a slightly different terminology here and
to substitute at times for "interest" (or "governmental interest"), as
Currie uses it, the phrase "policy" of the state and the "reasons" behind
that policy (instead of the "interests" of the state which are reflected in
its policy). My reason for doing so is that I desire to avoid the confusion
that might result if the same word, "interest," were used in two rather
different contexts, referring, on the one hand (as I and other writers in
jurisprudence have done) to the individual, group, and social interests,
whose competing and clashing claims created the compromise and ad-
justment reflected in the state's policy, and on the other hand (as Currie
and other conflict writers have done), to the reasons why the state has
selected a policy which compromises and adjusts the various competing
interests in this particular manner, and the reasons why the policy may
be applied to a case having foreign elements. Unintentionally, perhaps,
Currie may be misleading when he refers to these "reasons" behind the
policy and its application to cases with foreign elements as the "interest"
19. See notes 20o-3o, 89-111 infra.
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of the state or government in the case to be decided, even if he means
thereby the economic, political, social, administrative, and other causes
or factors ("interests" in his terminology) which led the state to adopt
the particular policy in question. On the other hand, the word
"reasons" is not an entirely satisfactory substitute, because to a large
degree the reasons are subsumed in a statement of the policy. In any
event, I agree with him, irrespective of the difference in terminology,
that the critical analysis here is to determine whether the reasons or
governmental interests behind the state's policy are such that the state
has a logical, rational, legitimate cause to apply its policy to the case in
question, in spite of the foreign elements involved in the case, because
the local elements of the case-the parties, the subject matter, the trans-
action, the accident, the injury-bear a rational relationship to the
reasons and interests behind the policy of the state.
This type of approach is not a simple one. It frequently requires
determination of four policies: (i) the forum's policy and reasons and
governmental interests involved therein in a wholly local situation, (2)
the forum's policy in a similar case involving certain non-local elements,
(3) the policy and reasons and governmental interests involved therein of
another state in a like situation where all elements involve only that
state, and (4) the policy of this state in a like situation where some of
the elements involve another state.
III
Clearly, the success or failure of this approach to conflicts cases de-
pends upon our ability to determine with a reasonable degree of pre-
cision the reasons (or governmental interests) behind a state's policy.
Only then can we ascertain whether the reasons or governmental in-
terests bear a legitimate relationship to the local elements of the case
so that its policy presumably extends in time and space to this particular
case. How do we go about making this determination? Fundamentally
it is nothing more or less than the familiar problem of construction and
interpretation of statutes and prior judicial decisions.
Here I suggest that the jurisprudence of interests, especially as de-
veloped by Pound and refined by Cowan, may frequently be of great
help in throwing light upon the reasons (or governmental interests)
behind the state's policy. If that policy is, as I believe, the outgrowth
of clashes of individual, group, and social interests, if it is a legislative,
judicial or administrative attempt to compromise, adjust, or prevent
these clashes of interests, then the better we can identify these interests,
their real nature, their conflicts, the better we can grasp the legitimate
reasons and governmental interests behind the policy in question.
This proposal to look behind the law or policy of a state to ascertain
the reasons or governmental interests involved therein, the clashing in-
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terests found there, is, of course, by no means an original one. Beale,
whose views have become the target for so much of contemporary
criticism by scholars, in one of his last articles, foresaw this development
and indicated his approval of it-indeed he showed a willingness and
eagerness to adapt his supposedly rigid views to recognition of this type
of approach to choice of law issues.20 He pointed out that what he
termed social-economic factors might well be decisive in determining
the constitutionality, at least, of choice of law decisions by state courts,
so far as the United States Supreme Court was concerned. Many others,
Cook, 21 Lorenzen, 22 Cavers, 23 Cheatham,24 Reese, 25 Paulsen,2 Harper,27
Freund, 28 Hancock, 29 to name but a few, 30 have urged a frank rec-
20. Beale, Social Justice and Business Costs-A Study in The Legal History of
Today, 49 HARV. L. REV. 593, 6o8-9 (1936), discussing Alaska Packers Assn v.
Industrial Accident Comm., 294 U.S. 532 (1935), and Young v. Masci, 289 U.S.
253 (1933): "These cases . . . mark the emergence of a distinctly sociological
jurisprudence in the decisions of the Supreme Court .... It has been the purpose
of the author ... to forecast a movement of social-economic thought which is
already beginning to take effect upon the law of today."
21. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457
(1924), reprinted in COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAws, ch. 1 (1942).
22. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE
L.J. 736 (1924); Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 47 L.Q. REv.
483 (1930-
23. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173
(1933); Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARV. L. REV. 822 (1950). But
cf. Cavers, Book Review, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1170 (1943).
24. Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLuM. L. REV. 959
(1952); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility,
58 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1945).
25. See note 24 supra.
26. Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L.
REV. 969 (1956).
27. Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading Pro-
fessor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947).
28. Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210
(1946).
29. Hancock, Choice-of-Law Policies in Multiple Contact Cases, 5 U. TORONTO
L.J. 133 (1943).
30. See also Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and
Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087 (1956); Ehren-
zweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts; Law and Reason versus
the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1951); Ehrenzweig, Alternative Actionability
in the Conflict of Laws of Enterprise Liability, 63 JURID. REV. 39 (1951); Shuman
& Prevezer, Torts in English and American Conflict of Laws: The Role of the
Forum, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1O67 (1958); Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV.
L. REV. 881 (1951); Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Con-
flict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027 (1940); Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the
Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928); Yntema, The Objectives of Private
International Law, 35 CAN. BAR REv. 721 (1957); Neuner, Policy Considerations in
the Conflict of Laws, 20 CAN. BAR REV. 479 (1942); Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong:
A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1944); Heilman, Judicial
Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws, 43 YALE L.J. 1o82 (1934);
Briggs, Utility of the Jurisdictional Principle in a Policy Centered Conflict of Laws,
6 VAND. L. REV. 667 (1953); Briggs, The Need for the "Legislative Jurisdictional
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ognition that the social, economic, political reasons (or governmental
interests) behind the policy or law of a state must and should be as-
certained, if possible, in order to help to decide the extent to which the
particular law or policy covers cases involving non-local elements.
In some instances-unfortunately all too few at present-this job
may be a relatively simple one. The legislature in a statute embodying
the state's policy may clearly indicate that the policy is to apply when
certain foreign elements are present '1 or is to apply only if certain
local elements are present.32 If these are the critical elements in our
case, we need look no further to decide if the state's policy does or does
not extend to our case which involves these particular foreign or local
elements. We know beyond all doubt what the legislature wished, and
presumably its wishes are conclusive, absent some state or federal con-
stitutional barrier. Thus in workmen's compensation statutes coverage
is usually extended by express language to out-of-state, on-the-job
injuries involving local employees and employers. 33 Other state statutes
sometimes limit their coverage only to cases involving certain key local
elements. 3 4
It is along these lines, I believe, that much can be accomplished in the
future. Draftsmen of future legislation might well emulate the practices
of contemporary careful draftsmen of contracts and other private doc-
uments. 35 The latter, almost as a matter of course, include a clause
specifying what state's law is to govern interpretation and often other
questions arising out of or in connection with the contract or document
(such as inter vivos trusts of movables) in question. True, these clauses
Principle" in a Policy Centered Conflict of Laws, 39 MINN. L. REV. 517 (1955);
Nutting, Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine, 19 MINN. L. REV. 196
(1935); Smith, Torts and the Conflict of Laws, 20 MODERN L. REV. 447 (1957);
Kelso, supra note 2; EHRENZWEIG, CONFLIcT OF LAWS § 5 (1959). But cf. Goodrich,
Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L. REV. 156 (1930).
31. For example, most state workmen's compensation laws cover accidents occur-
ring outside the state. See Roos, The Problem of Workmen's Compensation in Air
Transportation, 6 J. AIR L. 1 (1935). Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105.
Certain of the Uniform Laws attempt to deal with conflict problems. See the
MODEL EXECUTION OF WILLS AcT § 7; UNIFORM SMALL LOAN LAW § 18; and the
UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER AcT § 22(1). Cf. N. C. GEN. STATUTES § 58-28 (1950);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 625.O1(1)(a) (1956).
32. Cf. CODE OF VA. § 8-650 (1950), limiting actions for right of privacy to
persons (or their heirs) resident in the state, or to cases where portrait or picture is
used within the state.
33. See note 31 supra.
34. See note 32 supra.
35. Cf. Seeman v. Phila. Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927). See Symposium-
The Preventive Law of Conflicts, 21 LAW 9c CONTEMP. PROB. 427-605 (1956); Note,
Choice of Law by Contractual Stipulation, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 157 (1948); Note,
Commercial Security and Uniformity Through Express Stipulations in Contracts
as to Governing Law, 62 HARV. L. REV. 647 (1949); Rheinstein, Book Review, 15
U. Cm. L. REV. 478 (1948); Cheatham, Book Review, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1267
(1948); Rheinstein, Conflict of Laws in the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 114, 133-8 (1951).
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may not always be fully effective,3 6 but at least they are a step in the
direction of what might well be called the preventive law of conflicts.
So, too, frequently lawyers advise clients deliberately to plan trans-
actions so as to locate all possible elements in one state only.37 Again,
such plans are not always successful,38 but there is little reason for not
at least foreseeing such problems and doing all possible to avoid or solve
them in advance. The scope for private law-making here, however, is
obviously limited at best. Evasion of strong protective state policies-
fraud on the law 39-will not be tolerated; and one can hardly apply a
planning technique to unforeseen tort claims and suits. Here is a
promising area for the alert legislative draftsman. Even if he cannot
foresee all possible choice-of-law questions, he can surely, in analyzing
the clashes of interests involved and the policy he wishes embodied in
his proposed law, give thought to the extent in time and in space, so to
speak, of his policy, keeping in mind the reasons and interests behind his
policy. There seems little excuse for the almost complete legislative de-
fault and silence in this area today.
I do not mean that the legislation should take the form of simple
choice-of-law rules-the place of tort or of making a contract, etc. Such
legislation would do far more harm than good, since it totally ignores
the reasons (and interests) behind the basic policy of the statute.4 0
To a certain, and perhaps as yet undetermined, extent, there may be
federal constitutional barriers to this type of legislative action. The
Supreme Court has, to say the least, not always spoken or acted con-
sistently in this area.41 In the absence of further congressional legislation,
36. Cf. Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., 151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Owens v.
Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R.I. 162, 192 Ad. 158 (1937). See Yntema,
Autonomy in Choice of Law, 1 AM. J. ComP. L. 341 (1952); Cook, "Contracts"
and the Conflict of Laws: "Intention" of the Parties, 32 ILL. L. REV. 899 (1938),
Some Further Remarks, 34 ILL. L. REV. 423 (1939); Note, Free Will in Conflict of
Laws, Legal TTansaction Superseding Territorial Law and Receiving Foreign Law,
6 TUL. L. REV. 454 (1932); Notes, 54 HARV. L. REv. 663 (1941), 1o LA. L. REV.
346 (1950), 57 COLUM. L. REv. 553 (1957), 62 HARV. L. REv. 647 (1949); Levin,
Party Autonomy; Choice-of-Law Clauses in Commercial Contracts, 46 GEo. L.J.
260 (1958); Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 1072 (1953); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41 (1959).
37. See Symposium-The Preventive Law of Conflicts, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
427-605 (1956).
38. Ibid.
39. See Note, Fraud on the Law-The Doctrine of Evasion, 42 COLUM. L. REv.
1015 (1942); CHEATHAM, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD & REESE,- CONFLICT OF LAWS 519-20
(4th ed. 1957).
40. See note 118 infra.
41. See pp. 549-57 infra, and Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958); Cheat-
ham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 581 (1953); Jackson,
Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLuM. L. REV.
1 (1945); Dean, The Conflict of Conflict of Laws, 3 STAN. L. REV. 388 (1951);
Harper, The Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 883
(1947); Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REv.
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my own view is that the Court, at least so far as the full faith and credit
clause and the requirements of due process of law here are involved,
should strike down attempts by state legislatures or courts to extend
state policy to cases with out-of-state elements only when there is a com-
plete absence of any rational relationship at all between the state policy
and the reasons or governmental interests involved therein and the local
elements of the case. Perhaps the Court has not always followed such a
restricted view of its function here, but recent cases do, I think, show a
definite acceptance of this viewpoint. 42
In addition, attempts to apply state policies in such a way as to dis-
criminate unfairly in favor of local citizens or residents or against for-
eign residents or citizens may and should, I think, be properly stricken
down by the Supreme Court as violations by states of the privileges and
immunities 43 or equal protection guarantees 44 of the Constitution-an
area so far little explored. The fictional distinction between residents
and citizens of states in our federal system might well be buried in
deserved oblivion.45 And attempts to apply state policies to situations
775 (1955); Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in
the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1926); Hilpert 8C Cooley, The
Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 27 (1939); Langmaid,
The Full Faith and Credit Required for Public Acts, 24 ILL. L. REV. 383 (1929);
Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit, 29 VA. L. REV.
557 (1943); Ross, Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional
Law?, 15 MINN. L. REV. 161 (1931); Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal
System, 20 MINN. L. REV. 140 (1936); Overton, State Decisions in Conflict of Laws
and Review by the United States Supreme Court under the Due-Process Clause, 22
ORE. L. REV. 109 (1943); Abel, Administrative Determinations and Full Faith and
Credit, 22 IOWA L. REV. 461 (1937); Notes, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 751 (1935), 45
YALE L.J. 339 (1935); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 8-10, 40 (1959).
42. See pp. 544, 549 infra.
43. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. Cf. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898); Kentucky
Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544 (1923); Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 253 U.S. 6o
(192o); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952); Quong Ham Wah Co. v. In-
dustrial Acc. Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021 (192o), writ of error dismissed,
255 U.S. 445 (1921) (The reasoning and result of this case are open to question
(see note 45 infra) for the discrimination may have been a reasonable one);
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 6o9 (1951); First Nat. Bank v. United Air Lines, 342
U.S. 396 (1952). The last two decisions deal with the closely related but separate
question of the effect of the Constitution upon the right of access to state courts in
"transitory" causes of action having foreign aspects. See note 1 1o infra.
44- U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Tuka-
hashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). See Tussman & Tenbroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
45. The real problem is whether the classification is a reasonable one. Does
residence, apart from citizenship, have any significance which makes a distinction
between residents and non-residents reasonable? Cf. Douglas v. New Haven R. Co.,
279 U.S. 377 (1929); La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914). Absent such a significance, a discrimination
based on residence is one based on citizenship so far as the states of the union are
concerned. See note 43 supra. Cf. Chambers v. Baltimore 8c Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142
(1907)-
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involving foreign factors antedating any local connection with the par-
ticular case may well raise questions of impairment of contract ob-
ligations and of unfairness of retroactive legislation amounting to
serious due process claims 46-problems on which there is little if any
law at present.
None of these constitutional issues, however, should or do, I think,
arise where there is a rational relationship between a state's legislative
policy settling a clash of interests in a given situation and the local
elements, whatever they may be, in the situation. The scope for
legitimate state legislative action here is abroad, if draftsmen are bold
enough and wise enough to act.
Actually, most statutes-and also judicially created rules of law
and policy-ignore completely possible problems raised by foreign
elements. 47 Statutes usually are phrased in terms of "every contract,"
"every deed," "every action," etc. And the legislative history of statutes,
even where it can be investigated to any extent (state materials are
often meager here), is equally apt to be silent on these problems. Also,
statutory language and legislative history (especially in the state legis-
latures as distinguished from Congress) are usually quite ambiguous or
confusing or unrevealing concerning the reasons and governmental
interests behind enactment of the statute in question. The same is often
true so far as ascertaining the reasons and governmental interests behind
judicially created rules of law, such as the non-survival of actions against
tortfeasors. What should we do then to determine the reasons and
governmental interests involved in a state's policy for settling clashes of
interests? Sometimes, prior judicial opinions may cast light on this
problem-but here, too, the light is often flickering and dim. If the
language of the statute, its legislative history, and prior judicial de-
cisions interpreting the statute, fail to give a satisfactory answer here-
and unfortunately this is usually the case-we are left quite at sea, to
say the least. In fact, the problem becomes so difficult that it may be
suggested 48 that it is better to abandon this whole type of approach in
favor of a simple, albeit arbitrary, rule, easily applied by judges and
46. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § lo. Cf. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 433-5
(1957) (dissenting opinion); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933)
(dissenting opinion); Dean v. Dean, 241 N.Y. 240, 149 N.E. 844 (1925); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924) (see note 98 infra). See Currie, Married
Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflicts-of-Law Methods, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227,
230 n. 12, 257, n. 55 (1958); Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958).
47. See Cheatham, Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 430,
448-50 (1941); Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv.
959, 961-9 (1952); Cook, "Contracts" and the Conflict of Laws: "Intention" of the
Parties, 32 ILL. L. REV. 899, 9o8 (1938); Note, Preserving the Inviolability of Rules
of Conflict of Laws by Statutory Construction, 49 HARV. L. REV. 319 (1935).
48. Cf. Cavers, Book Review, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1170 (1943). But cf. Cavers, The
Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARV. L. REV. 822 (1950).
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lawyers to solve these hard cases. Perhaps so, but I doubt the wisdom of
this. Conscientious judges and lawyers are not apt blindly to follow
rules, however simple, which seem to them to lead to harsh, unfair
results in particular cases. Ways will be found to get around the simple
rules in order to achieve a just decision. The simple rules then become
riddled with exceptions, delusive in their simplicity, often traps for the
unwary, and serve mainly to conceal the real grounds for the decision.
They are manipulated by able judges in various ways-public policy, 49
characterization," fraud on the law and evasive schemes,5' substance and
procedure,52 the place of making or of performance or of injury or of
the tort. Simple rules contain ambiguous terms-place of making 13 or
of performance, intention of the parties. And competing rules are de-
veloped for identical problems, as in contracts.5 4
Absent any decisive clues in statutory language, legislative history, or
prior judicial interpretative opinions, we have little choice except to
fall back upon general logic and reasoning as well as a consideration
of the relationship of the policy in question to certain basic interests in
the community. Analysis of several concrete cases, based upon actual
court decisions, may be of help before we proceed further in our dis-
cussion.
Suppose a married woman 5f" at her home in state A, the forum, signs
a guarantee of her husband's credit in favor of a partnership doing
business in state B. She gives the document to her husband, who mails it
to the firm in state B. The firm, relying upon the guarantee, fills orders
for its wares placed by the husband, delivering the goods either directly
to the husband or to a railroad for shipment to him at his expense.
49. See note 8 supra. Cf. Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412 (1918).
5o. Cf. Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23, cert. denied, 293 U.S. 597
(1934); Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 1O8 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163
(1928); Graham v. Wilkins, 145 Conn. 34, 138 A.2d 705 (1958). Compare Dyke
v. Erie Ry., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871) with Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Grom, 142
Ky. 51, 133 S.W. 977 (191 •). See Shavelson, Survival of Tort Actions in the Con-flict of Laws: A New Direction?, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 8o3, 8og n. 22 (1954); Yntema,
The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN. BAR REV. 721, 727 (1957).
51. See note 39 supra.
52. Cf. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J.
333 (1933); Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. Rv. 153 (1944);
Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 MicH. L. REV. 392
(1941); Note, 47 HARV. L. REV. 315 (1933).
53. Compare Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922) with New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918). See Cavers, A Critique of the
Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 182 (1933).
54. Cf. Auten v. Auten, 3o8 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); Jones v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y. Supp. 4 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
55. Based upon Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878). See Currie, Married
Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflicts-of-Law Method, 25 U. CH. L. REV. 227
(1958); Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J.
457 (1924); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV.
173 (1933).
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When the husband fails to pay the firm for these wares, the firm sues the
wife in state A on her guarantee. A statute of state B provides that "every
married woman shall henceforth be as competent to bind herself by
contract as if she were unmarried." A statute of state A provides that
"no married woman shall bind herself by contract as surety or for the
accommodation of her husband or any third person."
Neither statute by its language indicates the reasons and governmental
interests behind its policy or the extent to which it extends in time or
space where extra-state elements are involved in a case. 56 There are no
helpful prior judicial decisions. What are possible reasons and clashing
interests which may be found in the different policies of the two states?
The policy of state A, of course, is based upon an old common-law rule,
whose purpose is buried beyond hope of recall in antiquity. Indeed, it
is very possible that the original purpose of the policy has long since
ceased to be meaningful in modern civilization of twentieth-century
America. Still, we must do the best we can here. Currie, 57 quite logi-
cally, assumes that the reason for state A's policy is a belief that married
women need special protection because they are peculiarly susceptible
and prone to make rash, improvident contracts of suretyship, partic-
ularly under the influence of their husbands. State A, of course, gen-
erally believes in freedom of contract, security of transactions, in pro-
tecting all reasonable expectations of promisees, but it subordinates this
interest in security of transactions to the special interest of a particular
group-married women-giving them unusual protection here. In-
terests of creditors as a group are made to yield to the interests of a
special, favored protected group of debtors, married women. State B,
presumably has a contrary policy for opposite reasons. Currie further
assumes 58 an arbitrary four factors as the critical ones: (i) domicile,
residence, nationality of the wife; (2) domicile, residence, nationality,
place of business of the creditor; (3) place of the transaction-where
the contract is made or to be performed; and (4) the place where the
action is brought.
If, like Currie, we can arbitrarily limit ourselves to a discussion of
these interests, reasons, and factors alone, then we can readily agree to
his suggested solution. The policy of state A should apply whenever the
married woman is a resident of A or of any other state having a like
policy for the protection of married women. The policy of state B
applies whenever either party is a resident of B.59 The difficulty, of
56. In the actual case (supra note 55) between the time of the transaction and
the filing of the suit, state A changed its law so that it was identical with that of
state B. This factor was probably the decisive factor, quite properly, which led
the forum to hold the wife liable. See Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412,
417 (1918); Currie, supra note 55, at 229-30.
57. Currie, supra note 55, at 230.
58. Id. at 231-2.
59. Id. at 254-9.
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course, as Currie recognizes, is that absent an explicit legislative dec-
laration to this effect, any such limitations are an arbitrary assumption.
There may be other reasons and governmental interests behind the
policies of A and B.
Perhaps A cared not at all about married women but, responding to
the wishes of a special group of creditors-professional sureties-enacted
this statute to prevent the all-too-frequent substitution of a wife for a
professional surety as a guarantor for a husband's credit. Thus A's
policy is one to regulate creditors here, not debtors. Or perhaps state A
felt its courts were too often thrust into family affairs when wives were
sureties for husbands, that such transactions were too productive of
perjury and fradulent transactions, so that the courts of A should not be
forced to try such actions. Or such suretyship transactions may be too
prone to lead to husbands and wives having title to property really
owned by them either held by others on secret or oral trusts for them or
placed in the names of their children. Similar conjectures may be made
about the reasons and interests behind the policy of B. Perhaps the
policy of B was really meant to aid married women, to encourage them
to take a more active part in business affairs, to add to their financial
knowledge about their husbands' businesses in cases of early widow-
hood, to enable them to enter the business of suretyship. Or perhaps B
felt that a contrary policy encouraged fraud and perjury in its courts,
led to husbands placing all property in the names of their wives. Or
perhaps the policy was an attempt to aid and foster small family busi-
nesses which could not otherwise obtain needed credits.
We have, of course, ignored any possible distinctions between
domicile and residence.60 Suppose the married couple had a store in A,
but lived in C? Or the creditor lived in D, but had his factory in B? More
important, what about time factors? What if state A 61 changed its
statute to one in accord with B's between the time of the husband's
default and the initiation of the creditor's law suit, or the trial of the
case, or the rendering of final judgment? Or what if the married debtors
changed their residence or domicile from A to B or even a third state be-
tween the time of execution or of performance or of default and the
time of initiation of the suit, or of the trial or verdict? Or what if the
creditor similarly changed the place of his business, residence, or
domicile? Even if one can ascertain the reasons and governmental in-
terests behind the policy of A or B accurately, it may not always be
easy to decide if these give A or B a legitimate cause for applying local
policy to the case in question, involving certain foreign elements.
Is the solution in such cases simply, in the absence of other evidence
to the contrary, to do as Currie has done, work out a moderate, rational
6o. Cf. Reese & Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 VAND. L. REv. 561
(1953); Reese, Does Domicile Bear a Single Meaning?, COLUM. L. REV. 589 (1955).
61. See note 56 supra.
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approach, based upon the assumption that the reasons and govern-
mental interests behind the state's policy are the most probable and
logical ones? Perhaps so. Before reaching definite conclusions, let us
examine another concrete case.
Four men,62 all residents of state A, while on a holiday motor trip in
state B, are driving in two cars which collide in state B, killing the
driver of one of them, severely injuring the others. An administrator is
appointed in state A for the estate of the deceased driver. The three
injured parties, their claims for damages being rejected by the ad-
ministrator, file suit in state A against the estate for damages caused by
the automobile accident. State B follows the common-law rule that tort
actions do not survive the death of the tortfeasor. State A by statute has
abolished this rule.
What are the reasons and governmental interests behind the different
policies of the two states? State A wished to favor the individual in-
terests of the injured persons, the public interest in making certain
such persons and their families did not become public charges, the in-
terests of the group of those injured in automobile accidents. The
reasons and interests involved in the policy of B are again shrouded in
the mists of history. Perhaps the most rational one is that finally set
forth by Currie 63 -protection of the group interests of creditors, heirs,
kin, legatees, devisees of the dead tortfeasor. Currie 64 further assumes
the four critical elements are: (i) domicile or residence of decedent;
(2) domicile or residence ol plaintiff; (3) place of the wrong; and (4)
place where the action is brought. He also assumes 65 that either dom-
icile of the decedent in B or ancillary administration there of his estate
are the two vital connecting factors for the groups B's policy seeks to
protect. On this basis, A's policy extends to situations where any in-
jured person is a resident of that state. B's policy covers situations
where the deceased was a resident of B or where there is ancillary ad-
ministration of his estate in B because he left property with a situs there.
Once again, absent a more specific legislative or judicial statement of
reasons, interests, and intentions, we can greatly broaden the scope of
our problem by further speculation. If there is liability insurance, what
about the chief place of business or place of incorporation of the in-
surer-does it do business in A or B? If there is liability insurance, of
course, then the estate, creditors, heirs, legatees cannot possibly suffer
if recovery is allowed, and all basis for applying the policy of state B
62. Based upon Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). See note
1o supra; Currie, Survival'of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Con-flict of Laws, 1o STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958); Sumner, Choice of Law Governing
Survival of Actions, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 128 (1958); CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COM-
MISSION, RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RELATING TO CHOICE OF LAw GOVERNING
SURVIVAL OF AcTIONS (1957).
63. Currie, supra note 62, at 219-22.
64. Id. at 218.
65. Id. at 222.
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for their protection vanishes. 6 What about domicile as distinguished
from residence of the parties? What about a change in residence or
domicile by any of the plaintiffs after the accident, but prior to trial or
judgment? What is the reason or interest behind our entire law of tort
liability in automobile accident cases-to punish bad drivers (im-
material here), to deter other potential careless drivers (immaterial
here), to compensate injured persons fully, to be certain no accident
forces a state to expend public funds to care for any victims or their
families, to spread risks of loss as widely as possible, to set up standards
of conduct, to give men protection against their fellows?
In all these cases we have individual, public, and group interests
clashing and forcing a state to adopt a policy to cope with this clash.
In the automobile case it is hard to find any possible rational legitimate
reason or governmental interest behind the policy of B which would
warrant B's desiring to apply its policy to this case. And the reasons or
interests behind the policy of A certainly give it reasonable cause to
extend its policy to this situation. The same result can, of course, be
reached by quite different reasoning. We can start with the rigid choice-
of-law rule that the place of injury determines all substantive matters of
tort law. We can still, however, apply the law of A, not B, because the
policy of B is too strongly counter to the local public policy of A, 6 7 or
because the issue here may be characterized, not as tort, but as adminis-
stration of an estate, 68 or because the issue is labeled one of procedure,
governed by the law of A, the forum.6 9 Or A may, perhaps erroneously,
determine that the whole law of B, in a case involving so many factors
connected with A, would apply the internal law of A on this issue if suit
were brought in B (as it probably could not be). Or A might even argue
that the place of injury is A, because this is where the disabled, damaged
plaintiffs reside and are suffering. All these devices ignore, however, the
really crucial factors-the clash of interests behind the policies of A and
B, and the reasons for these policies.
Yet determination of the interest clashes and reasons behind a state's
policy cannot and should not be made a mere mechanical application of
a pat, neat formula. Unless we are careful, in a desire to achieve a
simple, easy solution, this is what will often happen in tough cases.
IV
Suppose that an analysis along the lines here suggested finally reveals
a real conflicts case-a situation where the different policies of at least
two states for legitimate reasons may be applied because of factors in the
66. Cf. In re Vilas' Estate, 166 Ore. 115, 133, 11o P.2d 940, 947-8 (1941).
67. See note 8 supra.
68. See note 50 supra.
69. See note 52 supra.
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case connected with each state. What then? Currie 70 argues that the
preferable, the only defensible solution is for the forum to apply its own
law. So too, if the policy of neither state really applies, so there is a
gap rather than a conflict, then, if dismissal of the suit on ground of
forum non conveniens is not possible or desirable,71 Currie 72 argues
that the forum should again apply its own law and policy, unless the
reasons and governmental interests behind that policy clearly indicate
its inapplicability to a situation with the foreign elements of the given
case, so that the policy is appropriate solely for purely local application.
Currie emphatically-too emphatically perhaps-rejects the idea
that in case of a clash of policies, a court should weigh and balance the
competing policies-that of its own state and that of the foreign state-
and choose the one it deems fairest and most just.73 This decision is a
political one, properly to be made by the legislature, not the court. A
court has no right to reject or change the policy of the state. Moreover,
to do so in this manner may be most discriminatory. The state's (the
forum's) policy may be modified in conflict situations, but not in purely
domestic cases; if the policy is deemed an unwise or unfair one, why
should it not be changed for all situations, local and foreign? 74
70. Currie, supra note 62, at 243-8; Currie, supra note 55, at 249-51, 259-63;
Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964,
1001-28 (1958); Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Govern-
mental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9 (1958). For a
different and contrary viewpoint see: Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Con-
flict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1946); Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict
of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REv. 581 (1953); Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's
Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1945); Overton, State Decisions in
Conflict of Laws and Review by the United States Supreme Court under the Due-
Process Clause, 22 ORE. L. Rav. 109 (1943); Speidel, Extraterritorial Assertion of
the Direct Action Statute: Due Process, Full Faith and Credit and the Search for
Governmental Interest, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 179, 194-5, 224-5 (1958); Notes, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 751 (1935); 45 YALE L.J. 339 (1935).
71. See Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 38o
(1947); Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions
For Reform, 7 VAND. L. REV. 6o8 (1954); Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal
Forum, 6o HARV. L. REv. 9o8 (1947); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
veniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1929); Currie, Change of
Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 405 (1955); Comment, 25 U.
CHI. L. REV. 377 (1958); Note, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 234 (1958); Note, 56 YALE L.J.
1234 (1947); N6te, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 69o (1954); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 34-8 (1959).
72. Currie, supra note 62, at 229-32, 244; Currie, On the Displacement of the
Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964, 12-26 (1958); Currie, The Constitu-
tion and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26
U. CHI. L. REv. 9 (1958).
73. See note 70 supra.
74. Thus courts sometimes abrogate or severely limit policies deemed outmoded
in local as well as foreign applications. Cf. In re Grainger, 121 Neb. 338, 237 N.W.
153 (1941); Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288, 169 P.2d 913 (1946). To limit an obso-
lete policy for foreign situations only, and leave it in effect for purely local
situations, seems hardly fair to local persons. See Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, 384,
191 N.E. 23, 25, cert. denied, 293 U.S. 597 (1934). If the policy is a moribund relic,
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At first glance, this proposition comes as somewhat of a shock. After
all, we now recognize that courts do make policy for a state, do make
law, do make political, social, economic policy decisions. In fact many
policies of a state-common-law ones-are almost entirely judge-made.
Why should not a court similarly make policy and law in a true con-
flicts case? Why should it not decide to what extent foreign factors in a
given situation should or should not alter the state's policy for purely
local situations of a like kind?
The answer, I think, is perhaps a complex one. First, we have here a
clash, not of individual, social or public, and group interests, as in a
purely local situation where courts often make policy. We have here a
further clash on a political, interstate or international basis. Local
courts have almost always recognized their inability to handle such
policy clashes in a satisfactory way. The Supreme Court has carefully
refrained from intervention in the broad area of foreign affairs and
foreign policy, expressly recognizing that the President and Congress
are far better qualified, have far better sources of information, for this
type of case.7 5 It has taken a similar approach to "political" questions.76
In the second place, I suspect Currie has, no doubt for sound reasons,
somewhat overemphasized the lack of any policy-making in his approach.
Actually, I believe, there is far more present than perhaps would appear
at first glance.
There must still be considerable weighing and assessment of clashing
policies here-but it will be made by different organs, or at different
should it not be completely abrogated? Yet courts do utilize choice-of-law rules
here so as to abrogate such policies only in conflict situations, not domestic ones.
Cf. Thompson v. Taylor, 66 N.J.L. 253, 49 At. 544 (igo); Bowles v. Field, 78 Fed.
742 (C.C. Ind. 1897); International Harvester Co. v. McAdam, 142 Wis. 114, 125,
124 N.W. 1042, 1046 (191o). See Currie, supra note 55, at 25o n. 49, 26o-1 (1958);
Currie, supra note 62, at 23o n. 82, 251 (1957). For a contrary position, see Lorenzen,
Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736, 748 (1924);
Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 47 L.Q. REV. 483, 490 (1931);
Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173, 192 (1933);
Cook, "Contracts" and the Conflict of Laws: "Intention" of the Parties, 32 ILL. L.
REV. 899, 919 (1932); Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35
CAN. BAR REV. 721, 738 (1957); Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of
Laws, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1210, 1214-5, 1216, 1223 (1946).
75. Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); C. &c S. Air Lines v. Waterman
Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918);
United States v. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Wilson
v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). But cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. i16 (1958); Dayton v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958).
76. Cf. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549
(1946); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
1 (1849); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866); Georgia v. Stanton,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 5o (1867); Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham (No. 1), 178 U.S. 548
(19oo). See Carrington, Political Questions, The Judicial Check on the Executive,
42 VA. L. REV. 175 (1956); HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM 192-210 (1953).
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times, or in different ways than by a court simply choosing between the
law of the forum and the law of another state. A court obviously must
decide if the alleged policy of the state is in fact an existing one. The
state must have an ascertainable policy, suitably expressed in its law.
Next, in seeking out the reasons and governmental interests behind a
state's policy, obviously a court must to a certain extent weigh and
evaluate the innumerable reasons and interests which speculation and
conjecture and imagination can conjure up to alert counsel and judges.
Some will simply be dismissed as too fantastic, too improbable, in de-
fault of concrete evidence to the contrary. Others will be eliminated as
highly unlikely. A court is bound to undertake some weighing, some
valuation, some assessment of the rationality and legitimacy of the
seemingly endless reasons and governmental interests which may pos-
sibly lie behind a state's policy, and to eliminate those that are too un-
likely. Third, a court can and should weigh and evaluate the rationality
of the asserted connection between the reasons and interests behind the
state's policy and the elements in the given situation related to that
state. Is there a legitimate, rational link between the forum's policy
reasons and governmental interests and the elements of the case-resi-
dence, domicile, place of tort--connected with the forum? This of
necessity involves evaluation. The alleged link between the state's
policy and reasons and governmental interests involved therein and the
elements of the case related to the state may be irrational, illogical, too
tenuous, too remote or hypothetical.7 7 As already suggested,7 8 in our
federal system, failure of a state court to perform properly these tasks
may violate the Constitution. A court must weed out unsound, ir-
relevant reasons and interests alleged to be behind a state's policy, must
reject application of the policy to a foreign situation where the local
elements do not create a strong enough tie to the real reasons and in-
terests behind local policy to warrant application of the policy to the
given case. Moreover, as already noted, many alleged conflict situations
disappear when this type of analysis is made. There is no real clash of
different policies of two states, because the policies may be basically the
77. Cf. Grubel v. Nassauer, 21o N.Y. 149, 103 N.E. 1113 (1913); McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (Here
forum's only connection was that it was the domicile, but not the residence, of
an assignee of the insured); John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936)
(Forum's only connection was that the beneficiary, the widow of the insured, moved
to forum after insured's death; forum may not label issue of denial of recovery for
material misrepresentations one of procedure, controlled by forum's law, when
application of foreign law caused forum's courts no inconvenience and did not inter-
fere with any policy of forum relating to administration of its courts); Sovereign
Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938) (Here in fact the forum's alleged policy for pro-
tecting.its residents was nonexistent at the critical period, see Currie, infra note 88.)
In both the last two cases the asserted state policy appears to have been nonexistent.
78. See p. 536 supra.
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same (differing only in minor, irrelevant details),79 or clearly only the
policy of one state may be at all affected by the outcome of the case, or
the policy of neither state may apply, or the reference to foreign law
may not involve a reference to ascertain a rule of decision-the policy,
and the reasons and interests involved therein.
Moreover, as already suggested, legislatures can do much here by
specifying the scope of statutory policies in time and space.
Despite its obvious resemblances to the so-called "grouping of
contacts" or "center of gravity" theory,80 there are differences, quite
basic, between this theory and the thesis here advocated. The "grouping
of contacts" theory makes little attempt to eliminate or weed out ir-
relevant factors-those which give a state no really legitimate rational
connection with the case in question. Nor does it separate true from
false conflict situations-the spurious conflict cases where in reality
only one state, or perhaps neither state in question, has a legitimate
reason for applying its policy. Nor does it distinguish situations where
the foreign element and policy is a subsidiary matter and those where it
is the decisive rule of decision. On the other hand, the grouping of con-
tacts suggests there is a mechanical weighing, quantitatively or qual-
itatively, of the contacts in one state against those in the other, in order
to apply the law or policy of that state having a preponderance of the
contacts grouped in it.
Under our thesis, we must determine whether the possible connec-
tions of the forum with the given case, as viewed in the light of the
reasons (or governmental interests) behind the forum's policy, are so
slight or remote or speculative as to be ignored or disregarded, as not
to warrant application of the forum's policy to this case. We must make
a similar determination for any other state that allegedly has a con-
nection with our case. Only if both states have legitimate reasons and
interests for applying their policies to the given case, because of the
elements in the case related to each state, and only if the policies of
these states really differ and clash, is there a true conflicts situation
(assuming we seek a rule of decision in the state's policy).
Obviously, there are matters of degree here. What if we strongly dis-
like the policy of one state, the forum, believe it outmoded, irrational,
an anachronism, a relic of the past, as compared to the modern en-
lightened policy of the other state? Will there not be a-strong temptation,
by hook or by crook, somehow to prefer the policy of the latter state?
Certainly this cannot be denied. Moreover, if we recognize and ap-
preciate fully the fact that we are often dealing with policies here which,
under the mask or guise of a broad public social interest, actually re-
79. See note 12 supra.
8o. See note 54 supra; W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 57 o , 63 N.E.2d 417
(1945); Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953); Comment,
Place of Most Substantial Contacts, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1363 (1951).
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flect and represent comparatively narrow selfish group interests, we
may, as judges, be strongly inclined to reject a local policy, benefiting a
small, powerful group at public expense, in favor of another state's
policy which curbs this group interest for the benefit of the interest of
a far larger group or of the public as a whole. Yet there is great danger
here that judges will allow their personal views and opinions as to wise
policy to control their choices. Also, the result here is often that an un-
desirable local policy is rejected in cases with foreign factors, but not
in cases with purely domestic similar situations-an unfair discrim-
ination against the latter.8 '
V
This thesis raises other fundamental questions. Does it dangerously
ignore certain basic interests, peculiarly important in the field of con-
flict of laws, such as the need for uniformity of results, for certainty and
predictability of decisions, for vindication of the legitimate expecta-
tions of the parties, for promoting a general legal order, fostering ami-
cable relations among states? 82
It is quite possible that often conflict of laws has given far too much
weight to these interests. Thus complete uniformity is clearly impossible
without some super authority, some supreme supreme court, capable
of imposing its views upon all the world. No one advocates such an ex-
treme measure-individuality and localism have their values too in our
society. Indeed, one wonders if individualism is not in danger of being
smothered by powerful group and state authorities in many aspects of
our life. In so far as uniformity depends on cooperative action by in-
dividual states, this is obviously not a matter for courts to handle-
alone they can do little here. The courts of any one state cannot insure
that the courts of another state will decide a like case in the same way.
Moreover, on what basis may a state court reject its local policy, es-
pecially if embodied in a legislative enactment, in favor of a foreign
state's policy?
In a federal system, should the answer lie with the federal courts? Is
it not their function to handle clashes between the states as members of
the federal system? I feel that in diversity litigation, there is much to be
said for rejection of the Erie rule in so far as choice-of-law rules are con-
cerned.88 Yet, much as one may dislike 84 the results of the Erie rule in
81. See note 74 supra. This is true only when it is the forum's policy which is
deemed moribund. If the policy of the foreign state is deemed moribund, in a true
case of clash of policies, the forum will apply its own law; absent a clash of policies,
the forum obviously has no business abrogating outmoded policies of other states.
82. See notes 8, 2o-3o supra.
83. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941). See Currie, Change of
Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 405, 467-9, 502-3 (1955);
Currie, supra note 55, at 266; Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Compe-
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situations where the state courts have failed to analyze the choice-of-law
problems in the terms here suggested, and much as one might hope that
the federal courts would be more apt to adopt the analysis here proposed
if given independence, the fact is that it is hard to see how a federal
court can develop any criteria for choosing rationally between clashing
legitimate state policies in true conflicts situations. The federal court
is hardly in a better position than the state courts to make such a
choice. Actually, the federal court is a forum which has no policy in
any way affected by the case and therefore no good reasons to apply its
own law-there are no elements in the case which give the federal court
a legitimate choice-of-law connection with the case-and so the federal
court is simply called upon to choose between the conflicting policies of
two or more other states, each of which has a legitimate cause for ap-
plying its policy because of the reasons and interests behind that policy
and the elements in the case local to it. Absent congressional guidance,
what else can the federal court do except follow the policy, even if mis-
guided, of the state in which it sits (assuming that policy does not
violate the Constitution)? If state courts would adopt the approach here
suggested, application of the Erie rule is sound-is indeed the one
sensible solution. If state courts do not adopt this approach, unless the
Constitution is thereby offended, it is difficult to propose rejection of
the Erie rule unless one feels that federal courts would be more apt than
state courts to adopt the analysis herein proposed. Even then the federal
court would be in the unenviable position of having to guess about the
policies (and the reasons and interests involved therein, and the extent
thereof) of two or more other states, and presumably would follow the
policy of that state in which it sits if that state has a legitimate cause,
because of factors local to it and the reasons and interests behind its
policy, for applying its policy.85 Also, rejection of the Erie rule here
would not, of course, secure uniformity in state courts, which would
tence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules For Decision, 1o5
U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954); Wolkin, Conflict of Laws in the Federal Courts: The
Erie Era, 94 U. PA. L. REv. 293 (1946); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The
Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187 (1957);
Cook, The Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws, 36 ILL. L. REV. 493 (1942);
Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 6o HARV. L. REV. 9o8 (1947); Clark,
State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tomp-
kins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946); Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal
Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7 VAND. L. REV. 6o8 (1954); Hill, The Erie Doctrine
and the Constitution (pts. 1-2), 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 541 (1958); HART & WECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 633-6, 668-72 (1953).
84. There may be other reasons for rejection or modification of the Erie rule,
such as solution of difficult problems arising out of change of venue in the fed-
eral courts (see Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, supra note 83)
and proper handling of cases where there is no real clash of conflicting state policies
or where the law of the states other than the forum is not looked to for a rule of
decision (see notes io-2, 16-8 supra).
85. Currie, infra note 88; Currie, supra note 55, at 262, 266.
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still be free to follow their own choices, nor, judging by past experience,
would state courts be apt voluntarily to adopt federal views here.
As already indicated, I do not believe that the Supreme Court should
interfere on constitutional grounds with state court decisions where
there are real conflicts of state policy, where several states have legiti-
mate reasons and interests, based upon their connections with the case,
for applying their own local policies. The Court should intervene here
under due process and full faith and credit, absent further congressional
action, only, I think, where there is no real conflict, where a state with
no rational basis for doing so, viewed in the light of its connection with
the case and its policy and the reasons and interests involved therein,
attempts to apply its policy. The Court should also act to prevent un-
fair retroactive action or unfair discrimination against foreign residents
or claims, when necessary.
It is significant, I think, that when the Court has tried to do more, has
tried to dictate which of two states each with a rational connecion with a
case, should alone have the right to apply its policy, the Court has usu-
ally subsequently retreated. Often it seems to me the Court has gone
astray through failure to recognize the various clashing interests-es-
pecially the group and social interests-which gave rise to the conflict-
ing policies of the states in question. Certainly the performance of the
Court when it has tried to dictate an absolute single choice of law rule
gives one little reason to believe that this is a task suited to its abilities.
Moreover, the present Supreme Court already faces such a tremendous
load of litigation, that it is hard to see how it could find the time nec-
essary to take on an assignment as difficult, as complex, as demanding,
as this. Nor is this a task well suited for judicial treatment. State policies
are involved-yet the states themselves will seldom, if ever, be directly
represented by counsel in arguments before the Court-private parties
and their counsel will control the argument and litigation. In addition,
these policies represent compromises of conflicting social, group, and
public interests, and it is certainly doubtful if a court is equipped to
afford adequate hearing to all these clashing and varied interests.
Ordinary adversary, two-party litigation simply cannot fully and ad-
equately inform the Court of the scope and extent of the issues.
Perhaps it is significant that the areas where the Court has been most
active here are precisely those areas where the interrelationships of in-
dividual, group, and social intrests are most complex and have de-
veloped most rapidly. And, almost without exception, the Court, after
false starts, has sharply curtailed its role, as it realized more fully the
complex interests behind the conflicting state policies.86
86. See note 41 supra. I assume that full faith and credit applies to decisional or
common law of a sister state as well as statutes. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 436 (1943). Further, I assume that there is a denial of due
process if the decisional law of a state, as well as its statutes, is applied when the
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Thus, in the first case 87 involving conflicting workmen's compensa-
tion laws of two states, the Court required the forum, the state of injury,
under the full faith and credit clause to apply the law and policy of the
state of employment and residence of the employee to bar a wrongful
death action. Perhaps the result may be explained on the ground that so
far as a wrongful death action was concerned-at least one which gave
damages solely to heirs and dependents, not the estate-the state of in-
jury has no real reason for applying its wrongful death statute merely
because the fatal injury there occurred, unless heirs or dependents of
deceased are residents of the forum. No local creditors can be aided by
such a statute.8 The reasoning of the Court, however, was far broader
and seemed to say that in workmen's compensation cases the policy of
one state only could constitutionally be applied to any given situation.
Such an approach gives too little heed to the complex and varied in-
terests involved-the individual interests of employer and employee,
the group interests of workers and employers, the group interests grow-
ing out of the probable presence of insurance which spreads the risks
over a group, the social and public interests involved in obtaining goods
at lower prices and also in not having to provide funds to support
indigent injured workmen and their dependents. In the very next
case 89 involving conflicting state workmen's compensation laws, which
came before it only three years later, the Court, although reaching a
result in accord with the earlier case, spoke in entirely different lan-
guage, stressing the interests involved, the reasons and interests behind
each state's policy, the connection between the policy of each state and
state has no legitimate connection with or interest in the case. I also assume that,
although usually the question is whether the forum by applying its own law and
policy has denied due process or refused full faith and credit, yet it is equally
possible for the forum to deny clue process by applying the law of some other
state which lacks any legitimate connection with the case. Cf. Young v. Masci, 289
U.S. 253 (1933); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS 20 (tent. draft 3, 1956).
But cf. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 12 (1959). See Currie, supra note 62, at
238-9.
87. Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
88. See id. at 162, 163; Davis v. Herbert, 78 N.H. 179, 97 Atl. 879 (1916); Currie,
The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial
Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9 (1958). Possibly the forum has a legitimate con-
nection even here because one reason for its policy may be to discourage negligent
conduct within the forum. Cf. Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949).
89. Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
In workmen's compensation cases, courts of the forum are extremely reluctant to
apply foreign law even if the forum's statute clearly does not apply. See Note, En-
forcement in One Jurisdiction of Right to Compensation under Workmen's Com-
pensation Act of Another Jurisdiction, 6 VAND. L. REv. 744 (1953). Thus the forum
may deny a plaintiff all relief and dismiss the case if it decides the forum's law is in-
applicable, even if the plaintiff is clearly entitled to relief under the law of another
state, because the forum will not administer the workmen's compensation law of
another state. But cf. note ioo infra. This factor may well be a strong factor in
allowing the forum to apply its own law here, at least so far as the Constitution is
concerned.
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the elements of the case local to that state. Subsequent cases 90 have
reiterated this approach and also made it plain that the Court will not
attempt to choose which one of several states with different policies
each of which has a rational connection with a factor local to that state,
shall be the only state whose policy may be applied. Instead, the Court
permits each of these states to apply its policy, recognizing that the
complex interests behind these conflicting state policies make the choice
of any one state's policy here a matter not suitable for judicial deter-
mination.
In Carroll v. Lanza,"' the most recent case, the opinion makes another
important point. So far as the Constitution is concerned, it need not
be shown in each situation that the elements local to the state actually,
in fact, have operated in such a manner as to constitute a rational link
with the state's policy and the reasons and interests involved therein.
It is enough if there is a reasonable probability of the existence of such
a connection in such a situation. Thus, it is immaterial if in fact the in-
jured person in question did not incur hospital, doctor, and medical
bills for treatment in the state where injury occurred, because of the
probability that such persons will often do so. Therefore the state of
injury in tort cases has a sufficient connection to warrant application of
its statutory policy allowing direct suit against a liability insurer. The
Court will not be so particularistic as to inquire if the injured person
in fact became a burden to the state where the injury occurred. A gener-
alized reason, predicated on probability, is enough. The basis for the
link between the elements in the state and the state's policy and reasons
and interests involved therein may be somewhat conventionalized.
Should state courts follow a similar approach-to do so would
simplify the task of judges by permitting the formulation of standard
rules and obviating the need for specific inquiry in each individual case.
Yet such inquiry might often serve to avoid a clash or conflict with the
contrary policies of other states, so moderation and restraint might
often induce a state court to proceed cautiously if counsel in fact show
9o . Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 306 U.S. 493 (1939);
Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955). Cf. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 33o
U.S. 469 (1947); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank
Co., 289 U.S. 439 (1933); Collins v. American Buslines, Inc., 350 U.S. 528 (1956).
See Wellen, Workmen's Compensation, Conflict of Laws and the Constitution, pts.
I & II, 55 W. VA. L. REv. 131, 233 (1953); Hogan, Constitutional Implications of
Workmen's Compensation and Choice of Law, 7 HASTINGS L.J. 268 (1956); Lang-
schmidt, Choice of Law in Workmen's Compensation, 24 TENN. L. REv. 322 (1956);
Stone, The Forum's Policy and the Defense of Full Faith and Credit to Workmen's
Compensation Acts, 41 IOwA L. REv. 558 (1956); Comment, 33 TEX. L. REv. 917(1955); Comment, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 515 (1956); Note, 1o6 U. PA. L. REv. 472 (1958);
Note, The Supreme Court, 1954 Term, 69 HARv. L. Rav. 119, 133 (1955); Note, 54
MICH. L. Rav. 552 (1956).
91. 349 U.S. 4o8, 413, 420-1 n. 3 (1955). Here the injured employee was at once
removed to a hospital in the state of his residence.
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a lack of an actual link in the case in question between the elements in
that state and its policy and the reasons and interests involved therein,
even if such a link might ordinarily or would often exist. What about
the converse situation-where a link actually exists in a situation where
normally there would be none, where there is little probability of one
as a rule? One doubts if the Constitution should operate here to prevent
application of a state's policy under such a circumstance. But certainly
again a state court would be wise to exercise restraint and moderation to
avoid a conflict with policies of other states. Even so, where counsel
plainly show the existence of such a link, despite its high degree of
improbability, one wonders if a court is not apt to apply its local policy
in order to achieve what seems a fair result, if the court is kindly dis-
posed toward the state policy in question.
Commercial insurance is another field where the Court has long been
active with often puzzling and apparently contradictory results. Thus in
the famous Dodge 92 case the language of the opinion seems to proceed
on the basis that for the forum to apply its law to an insurance loan
contract "made" in another state with a resident of the forum, is con-
trary to the Constitution. Perhaps, as Professor Currie suggests, 93 the
true explanation of the case is that the statute of the forum involved had
in fact been repealed before the "loan contract" in question was made.
If so, it is hard to explain the Liebing case,9 4 where the opposite result
was reached because the loan agreement was considered "made" in the
forum, although here too the statute had been repealed prior to the
making of the loan agreement. In any event, earlier and later cases 95 in
92. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
93. Currie, supra note 88. See the Dodge case, supra note 92, at 367 n. 1.
94. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922).
95. Cf. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Clements, 140 U.S. 226 (1891); Orient
Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557 (1896); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S.
389 (19oo); American Fire Ins. Co. v. King Lumber Co,, 250 U.S. 2 (1919); John
Hancock Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936) (see note 77 supra). In the area of
public law, as to aspects of insurance regulation (statutes involving, not the relations
between the parties to the insurance contract, but the relation of the state to the
insurer, its agent, or the insured), compare Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897) with Hoopeston Co. v. Cullen, Pi8 U.S. 313 (1943). In the Allgeyer case,
the forum had no legitimate reason for imposing a penalty on a resident (who
merely dealt with an insurer) in order to collect a license tax from the insurer who
underwrote a "risk" within the forum but did not "do business" in the forum.
The resident acted within the state to effect insurance on property there with an
insurer not licensed to do business there. Today the forum's policy might well be
sustained as a legitimate effort to provide a local court for local residents insured
by foreign corporations. Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957).
See also Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 179 U.S. 262 (1900); Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551 (19 o4)-both cases involving non-constitutional choice-of-
law problems, where the Court refused, quite properly, to apply the law of the place
of incorporation of the defendant insurer, which allowed recovery, contrary to the
policy of the forum, the home state of the insured and the beneficiary. Cf. Munday
v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 252 U.S. 499 (1920).
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the insurance field use very different language-recognizing and
stressing the rational connection of the statutory policy and reasons and
interests involved therein with the factors in the case present in the
forum or state whose law was held to be properly applied.
In the Head case, 96 where the Court struck down an application of
the forum's statute to a policy loan contract, it did so on the ground
that there was no rational connection between the statutory policy of
non-forfeiture and the local factors (the original insurance contract
was applied for and delivered in the forum) in the situation. A similar
result was reached in the Dick case.97 The Dunken case 98 perhaps may
be explained on the ground that it involved an attempt by the forum
to apply its statutory policy to a contract made at a time when the forum
had absolutely no connection with the situation-only after a valid con-
tract was made did the insured move to the forum. The Delta 99 case
again appears to lay down a rigid rule that constitutionally only one
state-the place where the contract is made-may apply its law to de-
termine rights under an insurance contract. The Court ignored the
many factors in the case local to the forum (such as domicile of the in-
sured) which rationally linked the forum's statutory policy to the
situation. In the Griffin case, 100 the Court went to the very verge-some
would say over the verge-in order to find a possible reason or interest
linking the local factors of the case to the forum's statutory policy and
the reasons and interests involved therein, and on this basis upheld the
right of the forum to apply its policy. If the Court had attempted any
weighing of state policies here, it surely would have struck down the one
upheld, that of Texas, the forum.
96. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914). Cf. Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274 (19o9).
97. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (193o). See Note, 71 HARV. L. REv. 674
(1958). Cf. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., supra note go. But cf. Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co.,
22o F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955); Note, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1072 (1955).
98. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924). If the forum's statute be
viewed not as enlarging the obligation originally assumed by the insurer, but only
as a reasonable regulation of future actions by insurers in settling claims of local
residents, then the forum did have a legitimate reason to apply its policy to con-
tracts made before passage of the forum's statute or with which the forum
orginally had no connection whatsoever. Cf. Funkhouser v. Preston Co., 290 U.S.
163 (1933). The same result can then be reached by terming the forum's policy a
procedural matter. Cf. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
99. Hartford Ind. Co. v. Delta Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934). Plaintiff, the insured,
was, in fact, incorporated and doing business in the forum, which was not allowed
to apply its policy to the case, although the loss ocurred there. Cf. Griffin v.
McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Union
Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412 (1918).
ioo. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941), on remand, 123 F.2d 550 (5th Cir.
1941). Texas was the only state having such a policy, and it changed its policy a
few years later. Cf. 14 T x. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3.49 (1952); id., art. 3.49-1 (Supp.,
1958); CARNAHAN, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LIFE INSURANCE CON TRAcrs 3o (2d ed.
1958).
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Finally, in the Watson case, 101 the latest in this series, the opinion is
entirely in terms of the legitimate relationship between the forum's
statutory policy and the reasons and interests involved therein, and the
factors in the case which are local to the forum. Moreover, the opin-
ions-majority and concurring 102-recognize that the Constitution
does not limit the choice of law to one state (the forum) only here-
quite the contrary, the opinions recognize that other states in this same
case may also apply their different statutory policies because of other
factors which link those other states to the case. The Court, again, will
not undertake to decide which one, only, of these conflicting state
policies may be applied, when each one of the states has sufficient factors
in the situation local to it so that there is a rational reason for applying
its policy.
Again, I suggest that the Court has gone astray here mainly when it
has not realized the complex nature of the varied conflicting interests
behind the statutory policies of the states involved. Insurance of ne-
cessity involves group interests-the spreading of risks and losses over
a definite group. Individual interests of insured and insurer and ben-
eficiary; group interests of insureds and beneficiaries and insurers;
public and social interests in vindication of promisees' expectations, in
solvency of insurance companies, in protection of citizens against
hazards and risks so that they will not become dependent on public
funds-all these are interwoven in a complex strand. As the Court has
gained a clearer appreciation of the varied nature of all these interests,
so it has wisely abdicated any role which would compel it to choose
which state policy is preferable when several states' policies may ration-
ally be applied because of the reasons and interests behind policies and
the factors in the case local to each state.
The fraternal insurance cases at times seem to reveal a complete
misapprehension of the nature of the group interest involved-as in the
spurious application of the doctrine of class actions. 10 3 In general, how-
ever, the Court has rather consistently ruled that the state of incor-
poration has such an overwhelming connection with these cases
that only its statutory policy may be constitutionally applied,
no matter how many other factors there are present in other states
which would seem to provide a rational basis for application of the
ioi. Watson v. Employers Liability Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). Cf. Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). In Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916), there
was no real clash of state policies-the laws of both states were substantially alike.
In Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112 (1912), there was no proof the
foreign law differed substantially from the forum's. See Speidel, Extraterritorial
Assertion of the Direct Action Statute: Due Process, Full Faith and Credit and the
Search for Governmental Interest, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 179 (1958).
1o2. See the Watson case, supra note ioi, at 73, 75-6, 82-3.
io3 . Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938). See note 77 supra.
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contrary policy statutes of the other states.10 4 In the Wolfe case,10 5 the
latest decision, the majority opinion does not deny that other states
than the state of incorporation have a legitimate basis because of local
factors for applying their different statutory policies. Instead, the opin-
ion 106 purports to weigh and evaluate the policies involved, the reasons
and interests therein involved, and the nature of the elements local to
each state, and concludes that the state of incorporation must be given
preference in order to obtain uniform treatment for all policy holders.
I do not question the wisdom of this result, and I sympathize with the
Court's desire to act here in the absence of congressional legislation on
the subject when action is so badly needed. Yet I do wonder if it was
wise for the Court to undertake to make this choice-of-law. Originally,
when the first, early cases reached the Court, the fraternal associations
were benevolent, non-profit, non-commercial organizations, closely
controlled by members through a representative form of government.
State policies to protect local residents dealing with commercial in-
surance companies might well be deemed unnecessary to protect the
members. Today, the organizations, grown large, are impersonal, giving
members little voice in control or selection of management or its
methods, and thus are really very similar to commercial mutual com-
panies.107 Does the Constitution still bar states where insured members
reside from taking steps now to protect their group and individual in-
terests?
The wrongful death action cases--Hughes v. Fetter 108 and First
National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc.109-again contain
language which stresses a rigid constitutional choice-of-law rule requiring
the statutory policy of one state only to be applied. But other language
104. Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915); Modern Woodmen v. Mixer,
267 U.S. 544 (1925). Cf. Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 0915); Hart-
ford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 245 U.S. 146 (1917); Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, 305
U.S. 66 (1938). But cf. National Mutual B. & L. Ass'n. v. Brahan, 193 U.S. 635(1904). See Note, 57 YALE L.J. 139 (1947); Harper, The Supreme Court and the
Conflict of Laws, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 883, 898 (1947). In the Brahan case the Court
allowed the forum to apply its law about usury to a contract made elsewhere by a
foreign building and loan association with a resident of the forum. Actually, the
forum exempted domestic associations from this statutory policy. Query if the
policy would not be an unreasonable discrimination or perhaps a nonexistent
policy, unless foreign associations possessing the same statutory safeguards as
domestic firms regarding usury and also properly qualified to do business in the
forum, were not also exempted.
1O5. Order of Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947). See Currie, supra note
88. But cf. Trammel v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 126 Mont. 400, 253
P.2d 329 (1953); Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Duncan, 221 F.2d 705
(6th Cir. 1955).
io6. Wolfe case, supra note 1o5, at 624-5.
107. See the Wolfe case, supra note lo5, at 625, 629-41 (dissenting opinion).
io8. 341 U.S. 6o9 (1951).
109. 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
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in these cases 110 and the decision in the Wells case "I suggest that such
restrictions on choice of law were not in fact intended. The Court was
worried more about unfair discrimination against foreign claims or
non-residents, the related but quite separate problem of the effect of
iio. Hughes v. Fetter, supra note io8, at 612 n. lO; First Nat. Bank v. United
Air Lines, Inc., supra note log, at 398. Cf. Tenn. Coal Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354
(1914); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55 (igog); Chambers v. Baltimore
& 0. R.R., 207 U.S. 142 (1907). See HART &- WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 635-6, 668-72 (1953); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 32-3,
136-7 (1959); Note, 61 YALE L.J. 12o6 (1952); Reese, Full Faith and Credit to
Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, ig U. CH. L. REV. 339 (1952).
There are two distinct but related problems here. First, may the forum, in view
of the reasons and interests involved in its statutory policy and because of the
elements in the case local to the forum, constitutionally apply that policy (denying
plaintiff relief) to this case, even if the contrary policy and reasons and interests
involved therein of another state (allowing plaintiff relief) may also be applicable
because of the elements in the case local to that second state? Here, if the forum
lacks a sufficient relationship to the case, it should not be allowed to deny (or grant)
relief contrary to the applicable policy of another state. Cf. Holzer v. Deutsche
Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938); Griffin v. McCoach,
. 313 U.S. 498 (1941). Denial of relief may often prevent all recovery by plaintiff,
if as a practical matter suit can be brought only in the forum. Cf. Ciampittiello v.
Ciampittiello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947); Kentucky v. Paramount Exch.,
262 U.S. 544, 549-50 (923). Often it is also difficult to ascertain if the forum dis-
missed the case on the merits or not. Cf. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947);
Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412 (1918); Treinies v. Sunshine Min. Co.,
308 U.S. 66 (1939).
In the second situation, even if the forum's policy and reasons and interests
involved therein would usually warrant application of its policy to the case because
of the local elements in the case, the forum may decline to try the case in its
courts for policy reasons allegedly related to the proper administration of its
courts. Different considerations may be involved in the second situation when even
though the laws and policies of the forum and the other state are not in conflict at
all, the forum refuses for reasons related to administration of its judicial system
to have its courts hear a case with certain foreign elements. Legitimate policies of
the forum about judicial administration may well deserve recognition here and
entitle it to refuse to hear such a case. For a different approach, however, see:
Cheatham, supra note 41; Freund, supra note 28, at 1227; Paulsen & Sovern, supra
note 26, at 979-8o, ioi6; Langmaid, supra note 41, at 418-9; Ross, supra note 41,
15 MINN. L. REv. 161; HANCOCK, TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 39, 54 (1942).
II1. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 518-9 (1953). Cf. Carroll v.
Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Watson v. Employers Liability Corp., 348 U.S. 66
(1954). In the Well's case, where the forum was allowed to apply its own statute
of limitations, the forum was the principal place of business of the defendant in
the wrongful death action (the injury occurred elsewhere). It clearly had legitimate
reasons to apply its policy to protect its judicial processes and its residents against
stale claims and evidence made unreliable by the passage of time. Cf. Klaxon Co.
v. Stenor Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (Forum was also state of incorporation of
defendant); Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933) (Uphold application of policy of
one state with legitimate connection with case even if another state with a con-
trary policy has a legitimate connection as well); Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp.,
68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934). Compare Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S.
274 (19o9) with Western Union Tel. Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406
(1910). But cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914). In the Chiles
case, the forum, where the message was sent, was not allowed to apply its law impos-
ing a penalty for non-delivery. There is no evidence that the addressee, who was the
plaintiff, was domiciled or resident in the forum, and the improper delivery
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the Constitution upon the right of access to state courts in "transitory"
causes of action having foreign elements.
It seems to me that choice among conflicting state policies here is
not one that can wisely and suitably be made by any court, state or
federal. The federal courts can prevent unfair discrimination against
non-residents, or unfair retroactive application of state policies, or ir-
rational application of state policies to situations where there are no
factors local to the state which warrant application of its policy, in the
light of the reasons and interests behind that policy. If a choice must be
made here where there is a clash of state policies both of which have a
legitimate basis for application to the case in question, then I believe
the primary responsibility for making the choice is that of Congress.
The clashing interests-individual, group, social-behind the con-
flicting state policies are simply not amenable to the present-day judicial
or administrative process, without some intelligent and rational guid-
ance from the legislature.
Perhaps there is an analogy here to certain administrative law prob-
lems. 112 When a legislature delegates vast, sweeping, ill-defined powers
to an agency and simply tells the agency to solve a difficult social,
political, or economic problem in some manner which is "in the public
interest" or is "fair and equitable," with no more guidance to the agency
about the choices to be made among many alternatives, then the agency
is all too apt to flounder about, to vacillate, to render inconsistent and
unfair and discriminatory rulings, to be captured by strong group or
industry interests. The legislature, in all fairness, must offer the agency
some guidance, some definite specific goals, some indication of its
preferences among the many available choices. Similarly, in the field of
conflict of laws, in true cases of clashes of state policies we- cannot and
should not expect judges alone to do the impossible, to handle this huge
task unassisted, to choose rationally among clashing policies of sovereign
states. The legislature must and should provide some intelligent guid-
ance. Not that the job, at best, will be an easy one even for a legislature.
Certainly Congress will be wise to proceed slowly here, to deal with
specific subjects or policy conflicts rather than to enact broad choice of
law rules. I doubt if Congress should act here at all at present (and I
suspect it will not act) except in a few, narrow, specific fields. But it can
and should make an intelligent start. Congress 113 can act in areas such
occurred outside the forum. In the Commercial Milling case the forum, where
the message was sent, was allowed to apply its law to give damages to the sender
(apparently domiciled in the forum) for improper delivery outside the forum. In
the Brown case the forum was not allowed to award the addressee damages for a
telegram sent from the forum and improperly delivered elsewhere. The domicile
or residence of the plaintiff is not indicated.
112. See note 7 supra.
113. See Cook, The Powers of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
28 YALE L.J. 421 (1919); Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of
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as fraternal insurance, 114 workmen's compensation, 115 commercial in-
surance," 6 perhaps the legality of declaration of corporate dividends. 17
There is no question of subordinating rights of states to federal law, but
rather simply of stating which one of several conflicting state policies
shall prevail in a true conflicts situation.
State legislatures, as already noted, can and should do their part.
They can make explicit the policy of the statute and the extent of its
application to promote this policy. In enacting a statute they can clearly
specify often the extent to which the statutory policy is meant to apply to
cases with foreign factors, the extent in time and space of its application,
what are the elements which must be local to carry out the legislative
policy, which elements need not be local or must even be universal if
the legislative policy is to be fully realized."" Such specifications must
be drafted carefully, rationally, with moderation 1 and restraint. If
so handled, such drafting may well emphasize the basic policy involved,
the reasons therefor, the clashing interests-individual, group, public-
at stake, and perhaps lead to reconsideration of even wholly local policy
problems and elimination of outmoded ideas. Also, states must check
any desire to impose their policy upon the entire world.
Ascertainment and implementation of policy is a difficult job for
judges under the best of conditions. They need all possible help from
the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 21 (1945); Cavers, Book Review, 56 HARV.
L. REV. 1170 (1943); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215 n. 2 (933)
(dissenting opinion); Currie, supra note 55, at 266-8; Currie, supra note 62, at
245-6. But cf. notes 118-9 infra.
114. See notes 103-7 supra.
115. See notes 87-91 supra.
116. See notes 92-102 supra.
117. See Coleman, Corporate Dividends and the Conflict of Laws, 63 HAtv. L.
REV. 433 (1950); Hawkland, Control of Foreign Corporate Activity by the State of
Incorporation, 6 MIAMI L.Q. 41 (1951); Note, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 1210 (1940);
Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders' Individual Liability for Corporation Debts, 9
COLUM. L. REV. 285 (19o9); Hohfeld, The Individual Liability of Stockholders
and the Conflict of Laws, 9 COLUM. L. REv. 492 (1909), 1o id. 283, 520 (1910).
118. I do not refer to enactment of traditional choice-of-law rules, rules which
say which law of which state shall govern in a conflicts case, such as the law of
the place of injury, of contracting, or performance, etc. Cf. Stimson, Simplifying the
Conflict of Laws: A Bill Proposed for Enactment by the Congress, 36 A.B.A.J. 100 3
(1950); Sumner, Choice of Law Governing Survival of Actions, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 128,
143 (1958). Such proposed statutes would be most unfortunate, I think. What I
have in mind is a specification by the legislature that its statutory policy-as
survival of tort actions, protection of married women-is intended to govern
certain cases with stipulated foreign elements, or to control only cases with stipu-
lated local elements, giving an indication of the extent to which the statutory
policy is meant to apply to cases with foreign factors. See notes 31-2 supra; Currie,
supra note 55, at 258-9; Currie, supra note 62, at 246-8.
iig. There has been imperialistic lack of restraints at times. Cf. Rheinstein,
The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TUL. L. REv. 4
(1944); Rheinstein, Conflict of Laws in the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 114 (1951); CALIFORNIA LAW REvISION COMMISSION, RECOM-
MENDATION AND STUDY, supra note 62.
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legislatures. The legislatures can state policies in such a way as to reveal
significant factors behind the policies. Courts can then apply the law
and policy in such a way as best to effectuate it.
The courts too have a definite role here. That of the federal courts I
have already noted-to prevent rank, unfair discrimination against
foreign claims and non-residents, or the provincial, arbitrary, irrational
application of the law of the forum or of any state whose policy, in view
of the reasons and interests involved therein, has no rational connection
with the factors local to the forum or the state in question. The federal
courts should determine if the asserted state policy does in fact exist,
and that the real reasons and governmental interests behind it give a
not too technical or attenuated basis for applying it to the instant case
in view of the factors in the case local to this state. State courts, too, have
an important function. When the state legislature is silent, theirs is
the task of determining the extent in time and space of their state's
policy. Where there is no possibility of conflict with the policy of other
states, they can often exercise an enlightened and rational altruism and
extend their state policy and its benefits to all parties irrespective of
residence, to all claims irrespective of time or location or who is in-
volved, subject to constitutional limitations. If there is a state policy to
place upon local industry all social costs of the enterprise the policy may
be followed even if the place of injury is extra-state or the victim is a
non-resident. 120 In other situations they can avoid conflicts with policies
of other states by a restrained, moderate, enlightened interpretation
and construction of their local policy (and statutes) and the reasons and
interests involved therein, by disregarding irrelevant differences in
formalities between local and foreign policies, by seriously investigating
to ascertain if often the policy of the other state is not basically the same
as local policy. 121 Enlightened, restrained interpretation here can
minimize conflicts problems and contribute to a stable legal order.
120. Compare Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957),
with Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 512 (1950).
So, too, we have generally not discriminated against non-resident aliens, even when
constitutionally possible. Cf. Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266, 57 N.E. 386 (19oo);
Disconto Gesellshaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570 (1908); United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203 (1942); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Janusis v. Long, 284 Mass.
403, 188 N.E. 228 (1933); Nadelmann, Creditor Equality in Inter-State Bankruptcies:
A Requisite of Uniformity in the Regulation of Bankruptcy, 98 U. PA. L. Rav. 41
(1949); Nadlemann, Legal Treatment of Foreign and Domestic Creditors, ii LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 696 (1946); Comment, 18 U. CH. L. REv. 329 (1951). See Alaska
Packers Ass'n. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 1 Cal.2d 250, 255, 34 P.2d 716, 719 (1934),
af'd, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). But cf. 77 PA. STAT. ANN. (1952 & 1958 Supp.) § 563;
Coules v. Pharris, 212 Wis. 558, 250 N.W. 404 (1933).
121. See note 12 supra. Cf. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 401, 435 (1928): "What are likely to be crucial in the development of
any body of statutory law are the presumptions with which courts approach de-
batable issues of interpretation. For it is these presumptions which control decision
when a legislature has failed to address itself to an issue and to express itself unmis-
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State courts often have much leeway in determining state policies and
the reasons and interests involved therein. In cases of doubt, borderline
ones, it may well be that the forum's court will be inclined to extend
the reach of a local policy deemed modern and contemporary, or to
restrict the scope of a local policy deemed outdated and a historical
hangover. And, to a certain extent, the court will no doubt, despite the
dangers involved, be inclined to prefer a policy of a state which seems
to have a major connection with the case in question over the policy of
a state which at best has only a relatively minor connection, 12 2 or to
favor a policy which benefits the public at large instead of a policy
which sacrifices that public interest to the selfish needs of a small but
powerful group.
VI
One final point. Is Currie correct in arguing that in all true conflict
cases of clashing state policies the forum should apply its own law (as
well as in those cases where neither the forum nor any other state in-
volved has any real policy applicable to the given case, unless the rea-
sons and interests behind the forum's policy clearly reveal its inap-
plicability to situations with foreign factors-the gap situation)? This
rule will be a definite and certain one-the forum will always apply its
own law here. There will be few if any troublesome problems of renvoi
or characterization. Reference to foreign law and policy will be only to
internal law.
Will there be too much forum-shopping then? The answer here is
twofold. First, the possibilities of forum-shopping are apt to be exag-
gerated in many situations.12" As a practical matter, there are not many
situations where the plaintiff has more than a few forums available for
suit against a defendant. Delay in hope of catching the defendant while
he temporarily is in a certain state may be a dangerous game. Second, the
remedy for forum-shopping, after all, is not logically found in choice of
takably about it. If the intepretive presumptions of the courts are founded on prin-
ciples and policies rationally related to the ultimate purposes of the social order,
then statutory law will tend to develop the coherence and intelligibility, and the
susceptibility to being reasoned about, which a body of unwritten law tends always
to have. Otherwise, it will tend to become a wasteland of arbitrary distinctions and
meaningless detail.
"Legislatures in our tradition have depended heavily upon the assistance of courts
in giving statutory law this kind of in-built rationality. The articulation and use of
interpretive presumptions by the courts is an essential means of providing this
assistance. It involves no impairment of legislative prerogative, but, on the contrary,
facilitates the legislature's work rather than hinders it. It serves to focus issues, to
sharpen responsibilities, and to discourage buck-passing. It gives assurance that a
legislature's departure from generally prevailing principles and policies will be a
considered one."
122. See notes 74-81 supra.
123. See Currie, supra note 62, at 244-5. Cf. Curry v. States Marine Corp., 1ib
F. Supp. 214, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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law rules which only indirectly attack the problem. If there is a real
evil here, if plaintiffs enjoy too much freedom, may not the most effec-
tive remedy be the most direct one-changes in our rules about the
place of trial for "transitory" actions, further application of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens in a fair and intelligent manner,124 restrictions
on the concept of personal service as a basis for jurisdiction over de-
fendants? 125
Still, one may be troubled by a lack of sufficient emphasis here on such
considerations as certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result as a
major goal in true choice of law cases in conflicts. 28 Thus one can
certainly argue with much force that a basic interest in our social and
economic and political system, underlying countless statutes and com-
mon-law judge-made rules and policies, is that wherever possible, with-
out undue sacrifice of other equally basic interests, our legal system
should endeavor to make certain that the normal, reasonable, legitimate
expectations of persons are achieved instead of frustrated. 27 In a sense,
this idea is basic to our concept of the binding nature of contracts-men
should normally be required to keep promises which they have seriously
made in good faith and which others rightfully rely upon. The reason-
able expectations of promisees should be vindicated; bargains should be
enforced. There is a fundamental interest-individual, group, and
social-at stake here. If so, should we not usually presume that a legis-
lature normally does not intend to disregard this key interest any more
than is absolutely necessary to carry out other policies, and that there-
fore the legislature expects judges, in the absence of explicit language
to the contrary, to interpret statutory language, otherwise sweeping and
all-inclusive, in such a way as to encroach upon this interest as little as
possible? Even so, in certain cases-and more and more in modern
124. See notes 71, 11o supra. Cf. Elliott v. Johnston, 365 Mo. 881, 292 S.W.2d 589
(1956).
125. See Rheinstein, Book Review, 41 MICH. L. REV. 83, 91 (1942); Ehrenzweig,
The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 25, 30,
34-41 (1959); Comment, 10 VAND. L. REV. 438 (1957); note 11o supra.
126. See Griswold, Renovi Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184-5 (1938);
Griswold, In Reply to Mr. Cowan's Views on Renovi, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 261
(1939); Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 156 (1930);
supra notes 8, 2o-3o. But cf. Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the
Method of Case Law, 19 TUL. L. REV. 4, 29-30 (1944); Harper, Policy Bases of the
Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE
L.J. 1155, 1159 (1947); Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59
HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1211, 1236 (1946); Katzenbach, Conflicts on An Unruly Horse:
Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE
L.J. 1087, 1097-111 (1956).
127. See Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law,
19 TUL. L. REV. 4, 17-25 (1944); Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1943); Pound, Individual Interests of Substance-Promised Advantages,
59 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1945); POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, ch. 6
(rev. ed. 1954). See also note 3 supra.
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life-we know the legislature does intend to curtail the normal expec-
tations of parties, to limit their right to contract and bargain-but at
least we can insist that the legislature in these situations speak plainly
and to the point if it desires such limitations to apply to situations with
non-local elements in them. No doubt the legislature, to prevent easy
evasion and subversion of its policies, can curtail the power of the par-
ties to choose the law applicable to their contract or transaction, but we
should not lightly infer such a legislative wish.
No doubt predictability is also an essential element for our legal
order, and to some extent this may depend upon uniformity of decision.
Yet predictability is always a guess at best, no matter how uniform our
rules may be, especially in choice of law situations-there are too many
ways to avoid rules causing disliked results. Also, no doubt we can say
that one of our usual expectations in our present social order is that
regardless of where a law suit is tried, the outcome should normally be
the same. The mere fact that state A rather than state B is the forum,
especially in our federal system, is scarcely viewed by most people as an
adequate reason of itself for reaching a different decision if all other
facts are the same (which they very seldom are, as a practical matter-
judges, juries, counsel, witnesses, all may differ). To press the argument
even further, perhaps it even shocks our sense of fairness, arouses our
sense of injustice, 128 to discover that the accidental or deliberate choice
of one forum instead of another may of itself change the outcome of
the suit. Further, perhaps, are there not other factors here-the promo-
tion of a general legal order, the fostering of amicable relations between
states?
At most, though, I think the matter is one of relative emphasis here.
In ascertaining and determining the policy of any state-forum or
any other-a legislature and, to a lesser extent perhaps, a court must
keep in mind certainly such interests as those in uniformity, amicable
interstate relations, the vindication of promised or expected advantages.
These factors must be borne in mind whenever the state's policy and
reasons and interests involved therein are being shaped and determined
by court or legislature in any alleged or potential conflicts situation. We
should proceed with care and caution before deciding that there is a
true clash of conflicting state policies in a given case involving elements
local to each state only. Intelligence and moderation and reason can do
much to avoid conflicts of states over policies. But some such conflicts
will and do occur, and when we find them, we must face up to them
honestly. And here I question if a court should, except in the most
extraordinary circumstances, ever deliberately subordinate its local
policy to that of another state. Certainly it should not do so unless con-
128. See CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 20-1 (1949).
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vinced of the strong probability that by so doing, by so sacrificing local
policy in a narrow, limited, specific area, there will result the desired
uniformity and promotion of a reasonably stabilized and civilized
general legal order. 29 The price to be paid is a heavy one, so the ex-
pected result must be not only desirable but highly probable 8 0 Prob-
ability, however, is apt to be slight here. Unilateral action by the courts
of one state to subordinate local policy to the policy of another state in
order to achieve uniformity, must be based upon the expectation that
other states will adopt the same rules about the extent in time and space
of their policies and apply them consistently-an expectation which may
very well prove to be unfounded. Courts cannot, of course, like legis-
latures, engage in bargaining through multi-lateral or bilateral com-
pacts, treaties, or agreements. Even if they could, it may be doubted if
real bargaining is possible here. If a real choice of law situation is in-
volved, what quid pro quo can one state receive for sacrificing its legiti-
mate policy, except if other states will agree in other and different areas
of clashing policies to subordinate their policies to those of the forum?
But how could one rationally justify such trading off of rights in one
area for rights in another area? 11
Our ordinary choice of law rules-place of making, of performance,
of injury-certainly do not, it seems to me, bring about these results.
They have not, they cannot, achieve uniformity. They confuse con-
scientious judges, and obscure the real issues-the clashing interests
which result in the conflicting state policies.
A court should, I think, respect the position of the legislature, state
or Congress, as the chief policy-determining agency of our society. In
interpreting a statutory policy, the court must not, of course, give words
a meaning they cannot bear. Nor can it adopt any meaning which vio-
lates any established purpose, clearly stated. In this connection a court
should not infer a legislature as ordering a departure from a generally
prevailing principle or policy unless it clearly does so. Moreover, in
inferring the purposes or reasons or interests behind policies, the court,
in the absence of clear contrary evidence, may ordinarily presume that
the policy is not meant to be imposed upon the entire world, that nor-
mally the policy or reasons or interests involved therein are designed to
avoid, not create, clashes with policies of other states, and also to pro-
129. Perhaps the enforcement by the forum of foreign modifiable alimony decrees
is an example of this type of situation. Cf. Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal.2d 465, 283
P.2d 19 (1955); Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571, 574 (4 th Cir. 1954); Note, 53
HARv. L. Rv. 1180 (1940); Annot. 132 A.L.R. 1272 (1941); Scoles, Enforcement of
Foreign "Non-Final" Alimony and Support Orders, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 817 (1953);
Comment, Interstate Recognition of Alimony Decrees, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 692 (1953).
13o. See Currie, supra note 88. Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the
Forum, 58 COLUM. L. Ray. 964, 1007-9 (1958); Currie, supra note 55, at 246-7.
131. See Currie, supra note 55, at 263-5.
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mote uniformity and predictability. These general policies of the law
may well operate here in the absence of a specific reason or interest or
specific policy to the contrary.
Does this approach constitute an improper abdication by judges of
their duties and responsibilities? Often a purported refusal to decide a
question, to express a preference for one solution rather than another,
a referral of a problem to the legislature for action, really amounts to a
refusal by the judges to face up to their responsibility to decide a tough,
demanding case. It also ignores the fact that there is no such thing as a
refusal by a court to decide a question-someone always wins or loses,
gains or benefits, when the court refuses to act or refers the matter to
the legislature. Furthermore, legislatures are busy, and frequently a
hope that a legislature will act is a highly unrealistic one.
These objections do not, it seems to me, apply here. So far as a state
court is concerned, there is no abdication of its judicial function. It
must determine the policy, statutory or otherwise, for the issue raised
and the reasons and governmental interests involved in that policy, and
whether those reasons and interests warrant extension of the policy in
time and space to the particular case in view of the mixed nature-
foreign and local elements-of the case. When there is no good cause
for applying local policy to the mixed case, it must determine if there is
another state whose policy for good cause should be applied in view of
the factors present local to that other state. If not, it applies its local
policy, unless the policy plainly is not suited for such a mixed case. This
is certainly a judicial function. If the court desires to go further and re-
ject the policy because it is outmoded or harmful, this, too, it may do,
provided it is done for all types of cases, both purely local and mixed
ones-not for mixed cases alone. What the court should not do is the
non-judicial function of rejecting in mixed cases alone, the policy al-
ways applied in purely local cases when there is no valid cause, so far
as the reasons and interests behind the policy are concerned, for any
such discrimination.
Nor do I believe there is an abdication by the federal courts of their
responsibility in our federal system if, when there are valid reasons and
governmental interests for applying the different local policies of two
or more states to a given case because of elements in the case local to
each state, the courts do not attempt to prefer one state's policy over
those of all others. The courts fulfill their function if they strike down
rank, unfair discrimination against non-local claims and non-local
persons, and also attempts by any state without a clearly specified pol-
icy or without a good cause, because of the reasons and governmental
interests behind local policy, for applying that policy to a given case in
view of the absence of any factors local to that state which reasonably
warrant application of that state's policy. This is the proper role of the
courts in our federal system.
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